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1

HIS-STORY OF RELIGION

Of all the signs typically affixed to the banner of modernity, “secular” might well be the
most spectral. When approached genealogically, the circumstances of its purported emergence
from Christian theology threatens self annulment.1 As a mode of historical narration, its
developmental trope and its teleology have undergone systematic dismantlement by historians,
sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and cultural critics alike.2 As a lexeme, its denotation
has always remained in flux, having begun its etymological journey as saeculum, a temporal
marker. The Latin word for a large tract of time acquired a contrastive note with the advent of
Christendom as it came to stand in for this time, ordinary time, over against God’s eternity.
Augustine’s notion of a higher form of life in the “City of God” that worked alongside ordinary
life in this time added on layers of related contrasts until the temporal connotation of saeculum
faded away and “secular,” as an adjective, came to encode worldly affairs, as opposed to spiritual
life (Taylor, A Secular Age 264-5). Given the illusory status of the secular as a category, the
question becomes whether scholars and critics should continue using it at all. For this reason,
recent literary criticism has organized (post)secular lines of inquiry under new rubrics, for
instance the global, as seen in a 2014 special issue of American Literature titled “After the
Postsecular.”
In their introduction to “After the Postsecular” Peter Coviello and Jared Hickman contend

that “Replacing secularity with globality as a background condition of modern life has the signal

1

It is not an exaggeration to say all historicizations of secular ideology, including the most widely discussed
works in postsecular discourse such as Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007) and Talal Asad’s Formations of the
Secular (2003) build on Hegel’s history of Christianity.

2

See, for instance, Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular (2003); Judith Butler, “Sexual Politics, Torture and
Secular Time” (2008); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical
Difference (2000); Gregor McLennan, “Spaces of Postsecularism” (2010).
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virtue of introducing a master category that by definition theoretically makes all planetary
inhabitants full subjects of history and also is considerably more neutral in relation to religion”
(649). Attempts at moving beyond a “merely corrective” phase of methodological self-reflection
towards a reinvention of first principles more often than not reveal the deep indebtedness of the
self-same categories and theories that claim to liberate us. The big question becomes one of
transcendence: can the process of creating meaning in this world overcome self-referential
recursivity? This thesis proceeds with the conviction that any attempt at “moving beyond” first
requires an examination of the conditions of possibility. The following pages will show that too
much of supposedly postsecular scholarship ends up reanimating the very narrative that it tries to
kill off. The death of God is dead, perhaps, but we would do well to remember that even
Nietzsche’s original, ironic proclamation never envisioned itself as a finality, nor did it renounce
sanctity or divinity tout court.
Coviello and Hickman’s conception of globality in relation to history and religion makes
it incumbent upon critics to clarify whose history they speak for, and what they choose to
understand as religion. If globality narrates a maturation out of a past provincialism, it destines
itself to reiterate the Eurocentric assumptions underlying liberal multiculturalism. At its worst,
such historiography enables what Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang call settler “moves to
innocence” (“Decolonization is not a Metaphor” 1). In such a scenario, the very real history of

secular progress proffering itself as justification for colonial subjugation gets conveniently
forgotten. With respect to religion, globality must perform the well-nigh impossible task of
describing the localized “fragilizations” of religion while respecting religion’s claim to ontology
metaphysics. If secular ideology had a way of defining religion “by the bands of their
opposition” (Derrida 43), globality carries the risk of dissolving religious singularity. To their
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credit, Coviello and Hickman are clear-eyed in their characterization of globality as an
instantiation of a postsecular frame, not without its complications. As always, the foundational
paradox of correcting a thing that doesn’t quite exist (at least in the neat way that intellectual
categories set it up to be) bedevils all endeavors of postsecular re-thinking.
Etymology makes time and history the originating problematic of the secular. The
modern lexeme “religion” enjoys no such clarity, ergo performing the methodological quandary
that it creates. Cicero traced the classical etymology of religio, which signified
“conscientiousness, sense of right, moral obligation, duty” (Lewis, Latin Dictionary), to
relegere, to re-trace or re-read (Cicero 193). On the other hand, the Roman grammarian Servius
(and later, St. Augustine) preferred to reference religare, to re-bind or re-connect (Hoyt 126). To
re-read or to re-connect: the word itself already encompasses semiotics in that nothing exists
behind the shell of referentiality besides further interpretation. Simultaneously, the continuing
process of socio-cultural re-binding constitutes a totalizing system, especially as religio pertains
to ways of knowing and acting in the world. From the internalized paradox of religio sprang the
secularizing arc of modernity (or so the story goes), which, in turn, engendered “religion” as it
has been reread and reconnected today.
Hegel’s historical account of Christianity still remains the most powerful tool for secular
apologetics and postsecular polemics alike for the way in which it theorizes Christianity’s

collapse/expansion into paradox. Unsurprising for Hegel, his conceptualization of the secular
points everywhere and nowhere; the secular structures what can be known and seen, and what
stays out of reach. Together, Lectures on the Philosophy of History and Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion lay out a developmental schematic in which Protestantism represents
Christianity’s maximal realization (O’Regan 133). It is Protestant Christianity’s aim of achieving
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“universal access to the particular qualities of freedom and knowledge” that allows Christian
symbols such as the death of God and “Kenosis” (self-emptying) to fulfill their promise
(O’Regan 133). Hegel effectively constructs a teleology of Christianity, for it is only in a
thoroughly de-divinized modernity that Christianity can achieve its dream of universalization. In
the present time, Slavoj Žižek follows Hegel’s conclusion with minimal emendation when he remythologizes the contradictions exposed on the cross as one of (i) God contesting himself,
within himself and (ii) one in which a sovereign infinitude transcends into, not beyond, the
finitude of this world (O’Regan 138). Stated differently, Christianity’s immanent transcendence
(already an oxymoron) proceeds on the self-nullifying premise that only God can contradict
God—a paradox that reinscribes foundational alterity into the figure of Jesus.
Cyril O’Regan gets to the crux of the matter when he summarizes Hegel’s secularizing
logic as follows: “Precisely as the ideological warrant of the maximal realization of freedom and
reason, Christianity is the foundation of the modern secular sphere” (134). The Canadian
philosopher Charles Taylor uses Hegel’s argument as a starting point for his own broad sweep of
secular history. In his magnum opus A Secular Age (2007), he tracks all of the major lineaments
of Enlightenment humanism in order to elucidate their contributions to Western secularity.
Instead of fixating on precise definitions of the secular, Taylor focuses on the background
conditions that made its historical emergence possible. He identifies two powerful secularizing

forces in “disembedding” and “disenchantment,” which took the pre-modern “porous self” out of
its social, spiritual, and physical enmeshments and hardened the boundaries of its individuality.
The porous self’s dramatized maturation goes something like this:
Living a godly life in this world is something very different from living in the
ordered Aristotelian Cosmos of Aquinas … It is no longer a matter of admiring a
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normative order in which God has revealed himself through signs and symbols.
We rather have to inhabit it as agents of instrumental reason, working the system
effectively in order to bring about God’s purposes … These are not just two
different stances, but two incompatible ones. We have to abandon the attempt to
read the cosmos as the locus of signs … Not just on the level of popular belief, as
a world of spirits, do we have to disenchant the universe; we have also to … trade
in a universe of ordered signs, in which everything has a meaning, for a silent but
beneficent machine. (Taylor 99)
What finally closes the door on the old world of charms, spirits and fate is the emergence of
something that Taylor calls the “immanent frame.” For the budding Enlightenment subject, the
immanent frame decisively severs the last fraying threads tying divine beings to natural order.
This move owed less to any new truths that had been discovered—though the developing
knowledge discipline of science certainly played a role—and had far more to do with shifting
social imaginaries. Thus, the sign of the Other begins to loom large in the historical emergence
of the secular. One would think that Taylor’s fine-tuned historicism would begin to shift its
focus, but strangely enough, his book never accomplishes that turn. Even when describing the
historic explosion of spiritual options in the United States, he neglects to expound on the precise
role of alterity in helping to produce the “nova effect.”

The anthropologist Saba Mahmood has put forth the most sustained critique of Taylor’s
majoritarian tendencies in her scholarship on secular governance in Egypt. She stakes her
intervention in all othered regions of the globe when she faults Taylor’s historicism for its
complicity in “the operation of modern secular power” (Mahmood 294). Some scholars have
questioned the necessity of all broad gestures, accusing postsecularism of “seeking to normalize
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certain religious and social practices and forms of authority and social imagination as
representative of ‘the people’” (Mufti 18). Far-reaching critiques have their time and place,
especially when dealing with the base formations of modernity in the North Atlantic. However, if
(as Taylor and others claim) secularism and secularity do indeed behave differently in North
America, it behooves critics to attune themselves to the othered voices that have had a
foundational relationship with the dominant political imaginaries of the land.
The “discovery” of the “New World” by the monarchies of Europe marked a profound
rupture in the known world for Christian theologians. The Standing Rock Sioux scholar and
activist Vine Deloria Jr. points to a 1493 Inter Caetera bull by Pope Alexander VI as an early
indicator of Christianity’s ambitions for the “newly discovered” land and its people. In granting
“to you and your heirs and successors, kings of Castile and Leon, all singular the aforesaid
countries and islands,” the Pope assured God’s pleasure in seeing “that in our times especially
the Catholic faith and the Christian religion be exalted […] that the health of souls be cared for
and that barbarous nations be overthrown and brought to the faith itself” (qtd. in Deloria, God is
Red 258). The oxymoron of proprietary theft, the paternal pretense of stewardship, and the
violence of conquest: the three mainstays of ecumenical “care” would remain constant long after
missionary logic reorganized itself into the ideology of empire, laying bare the close
interconnections between colonialism and the politics of liberal secularism. As Deloria states in

his widely discussed polemic God is Red (1973), “Western religion seems to have resolved this
problem of interpretation by secularizing itself. Instead of working toward the Kingdom of God
on Earth, history becomes the story of a particular race fulfilling its manifest destiny” (68).
Furthering Deloria’s insight, the Anishinaabe writer and critic Gerald Vizenor uncovers the role
of literary culture in authorizing colonial theft, absent the political authority of the Church. The
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institutionalized role of colonialist literature, which Vizenor refers to in the title of his
monograph, Manifest Manners (1994), is captured in Wallace Stegner’s declaration that “No
place, not even a wild place, is a place until it has had that human attention that in its highest
reach we call poetry” (qtd. in Vizenor 10). No different from colonial dispossession, literary
discovery of place inscribes the absence of tribal remembrance.
That the old insights of Indigenous experience might strike postsecular discourse as
new(s) only underscores the immense difficulty of reforming the church of secularism from the
inside. Indeed, the only effective way to appraise the edifice of the secular may be from the
outside. Thirty-four years before Taylor’s history of the secular, Deloria had already argued
rigorously for an anti-historicist understanding of Indigenous religion. The history of religion
(especially its triumphalist variant) is one in which religion becomes “an evolutionary process in
which mankind progresses from primitive superstitions to logically perfected codes of conduct,
from a multiplicity of deities to a monotheistic religion with well-developed institutions and
creeds honed to philosophical purity of expression” (Deloria, God is Red 64). The idea that
institutions and creeds conspire to propagate a “purified” monotheism receives further attention
from Vizenor. In his discussion of “terminal creeds,” Vizenor sheds light on symbolic structures
that reproduce themselves as unchanging narrative/representative truths. Amidst the ruins of
postmodern simulations, narratives about the “disappearing Indian,” the “natural Indian,” or the

“primitive, superstitious Indian” (among others) take on institutional solidity as they endlessly
copy and re-copy dominant definitions of “Indian.” Terminal creeds all share the same formal
features in their humorless, monologic fixity.
For both Vizenor and Deloria, the answer to dominant narratives comes through the
land—a locus of spiritual and symbolic power for Indigenous tribes. The land possesses sacred
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“power” that attains intelligibility through Indigenous knowledges, experiences and memories.
“Sacred places are the foundation of all other beliefs and practices because they represent the
presence of the sacred in [Indigenous] lives” (Deloria, God is Red 285). Because no human
structure can contain the sacred, the idea of sacred land in particular poses a fundamental threat
to the authority of the secular nation state. The United States’ history of violently suppressing
tribal ceremonies and rituals (graphically displayed by the events of the Wounded Knee
Massacre) directly relates to the country’s colonial desire for Indigenous land. Ongoing efforts
by federal courts to circumscribe Indigenous religious practices according to geographic
boundaries, historical records, and a liberal rights regime merely represent the latest iteration of a
long historical process.

On August 11, 1978, President Carter signed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
into law. The act represented the U.S. government’s effort to correct for a history of governmentsponsored religious persecution and cultural genocide. Reading the text of the law, one
recognizes how legal formalism makes correcting for history and correcting history coterminous
businesses in the liberal nation state. “Whereas the freedom of religion for all people is an
inherent right,” begins Public Law 95-341, after which it states, “Whereas the United States has
traditionally rejected the concept of a government denying individuals the right to practice their

religion and, as a result, has benefited from a rich variety of religious heritages in this country”
(United States Congress Section 1996). Formally speaking, “whereas” clauses structure the logic
that compels the operative provisions of a contract or statute. In critical legal studies, legal
formalism has been “summed up as proffering the possibility of an ‘immanent moral
rationality’” (Weinrib 954), whereby the “immanent operation of legal rationality, characterizes
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law’s distinctiveness affirmatively through the claim that the content of law is elaborated from
within” (954). Yet the opening clauses of PL 95-341 show how immanent law retroactively
authorizes itself in its declaration of transcendent truths. The initiating term “Whereas”
ritualistically summons citizen subjects into a heightened social plane from within which the
state proclaims the stability and ontic authority of its rights regime.
The opening act of self-authorization sets the stage for a subsequent set of selfabsolutions: “Whereas such religious infringements result from the lack of knowledge […]
Whereas such laws were designed for such worthwhile purposes as conservation and
preservation of natural species and resources but were never intended to relate to Indian religious
practices […]” (United States Congress Section 1996). The great irony is that in its stated effort
to “protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to […] traditional
religions” (United States Congress Section 1996), the statute interpellates the “Indian” into its
own civil religion. The formalism of the law takes on a ritualistic cast; a formal recitation of
transcendent principles precedes ritualized purifications of the state’s past pollutions, which get
framed as honest mistakes made in the name of nature conservation. To historically dispossessed
and persecuted Indigenous nations, the hollowness of the opening invocations of PL 95-341 lays
bare the semantic vacuum at the core of ritual, at least in the way that ritual operates as a
Western technology of power. As Maurice Bloch argues, it isn’t so much its content as its

formalized expression that matters (“Symbols” 55-6). Ritual, in other words, defines itself by the
constraints it places on syntax.
As it happens, PL 95-341 perfectly embodies the anthropologist Talal Asad’s critique of
ritual as an analytic category. In Genealogies of Religion (1993), he argues that “ritual” remains
irreparably shot through with modern Western assumptions about the individual and the state.
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The hegemonic function of the term renders it another historically shaped organization of power
that obscures the diversity and incommensurability amongst historical manifestations of socalled ritual activities (Asad 55-79). Asad’s criticism easily extends to religion itself, and we
need only interrogate the manner in which PL 95-341 constitutes Native American religion to
discover the central question that motivates Asad’s widely discussed monograph, Formations of
the Secular. “What is the connection,” Asad asks, “between ‘the secular’ as an epistemological
category and ‘secularism’ as a political doctrine?” (1). In making religion epistemologically
manageable, “secular ideology” narrows down religion’s purview to the domain of private
“belief.” The privatization of belief serves to seal off a naturalized comprehension of socially
saturated, organizable space from any and all intrusions by the supernatural. This division, in
turn, empowers “secularism” as the arbiter of “this-worldliness” predicated upon the realrational. As seen in PL 95-341, the demarcation of this-worldliness from other-worldliness has
the ironic effect of conjuring a transcendent “political metaphysic,” in which the consolidation of
the rational, self-possessed, rights bearing citizen relegates faith and belief to the domain of
imaginary-irrational-private.
Manichaeism can engender only a coercive and exclusionary logic of enforcement that
belies the tolerant facade of the liberal, secular state. Hence, PL 95-341 subordinates Native
American religions to the citizen’s right to freedom from its very title. The irreducible diversity

of Native American customs, traditions, ceremonies and rituals can only find expression through
a negative articulation of material rights. In both God is Red and Red Earth, White Lies (1995),
Deloria explains how even those limited articulations of religious rights were subsequently
eroded by a federal judiciary that didn’t hesitate to contradict both precedent and logic to
overturn tribal protections. Two Supreme Court rulings from 1988 and 1990 are noteworthy for
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their affirmation of flagrantly secularist standards on what constitutes religion. Citing Justice
O’Connor’s invocation of “spiritual well-being,” “sincerely held religious beliefs,” and a
citizen’s “own search for spiritual fulfillment” in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association (1988), Deloria deplores the degradation of venerable Indigenous traditions to “a
matter of individual aesthetic choice” (God is Red 273).
Taking such history into consideration, postsecular interpretation can proceed along two
tracks in the study of literature: the first takes place in the wake of poststructuralism and asserts
an enduring spirituality and religiosity in the meaning making process (Branch, “Rituals”;
Schwartz, “Poetics”; Finkelstein, “Mount Vision”). The second confronts a disciplinary past and
present overdetermined by a triumphalist narrative of secular progress (Kaufmann, “The
Religious”; Pecora, “Secularization”). On a fundamental level, both tracks respond to a “modern
Anglo-American Literary Academy” that continues to re-inscribe Matthew Arnold’s age old
prophecy, that the demise of religious authority will inaugurate literature as a de-divinized
vehicle for the “core values of religion” (Finkelstein 14). To the extent that the writing of history
is a form of poiesis, and all meaning making unfolds in time and history, both tracks can be said
to contain each other; it would be misleading to claim that postsecular discourse maintains neat
divisions. Where disagreements do break out, religious representation often informs the main
points of contention. Tracy Fessenden reminds critics of Asad’s polemics (though she never

names him) when she accuses postsecular literary criticism of invoking a “spiritual” present that
answers to beliefs entirely lacking in content. Fessenden trains her critical eye on Thomas
McLure’s book Partial Faiths, which in her view, merely reaffirms the Arnoldian replacement
story for literature. A look at McLure’s chapter on Native American literature confirms
Fessenden’s criticism. Overly confident in his argument that a breakdown of spiritual
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intelligibility fragments modern religious belief into “partial faiths,” he glosses writers from
disparate tribes and traditions. Consequently, McClure treats Native American literature as an
unproblematic, bounded category that readily melts into a postmodern “spiritual” landscape.
Stepping outside of literary criticism for a moment, one notices that the sharpest
historical critiques of postsecular methodology tend to come from social scientists operating in
postcolonial circles. Though Mahmood aims at Taylor, she might as well be addressing McLure
when she accuses Taylor’s historicism of eliding the story of how modernity took shape in the
context of “Christianity’s encounters with its ‘others’” (Mahmood, “Other-Wise” 285). On an
oppositional note, Lori Branch urges postsecular literary scholarship to fulfill a “religious turn”
that continental philosophy from Wittgenstein onwards have moved towards but never managed
to complete. In “The Rituals of Our Re-Secularization” she argues that a factually oriented
fixation on the representational mechanics of class, race, gender, empire and so forth, ultimately
buttresses a materialist status quo in the academy. Her counsel to postcolonial literary critics is
that they impoverish their own politics by shying away from positivizing the negative theological
dimensions of literary theory (Branch, “Rituals” 26-9).
From a higher altitude, controversies over postsecular methodologies appear somewhat
circular, for the tension between historicism and linguistics replicates the etymological
divergence between saeculum as a matter of time and religio as a question of meaning making.

Some crucial disambiguations become necessary at this juncture. First, it must be made clear that
a religiously shaped entity, event, category, or idea need not maintain any direct correspondence
with religion proper. This means, for instance, that redemptive outlooks in secular theory can be
articulated without reference to divine intervention or theological formulations of good and evil.
The same goes for religion as it has been purportedly produced by secularism. What we want to
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avoid is a fallacy of origins that, couched as history, becomes a form of determinism: because
secularism was Christian in origin (and vice versa), it is bound to remain that way. A semiotic
parallel to this principle prevents the religious and the secular from being referentially locked
into each other. Second, we must resist the temptation to essentialize the religious and the secular
as stable, necessarily opposed signs. Asad himself says as much in Formations of the Secular
despite the decisively anti-secular cast of his anti-statist rhetoric. Non-essentialism obliges us to
view both secularism and religion as malleable formations, changing in response to various
social, political, and environmental pressures. Hence, Asad cautions against “hasty
pronouncements about the virtues or vices of secularism” (17)— a directive that opens the way
for his tentative vision of a negotiated minoritarian democracy that “secular Europe could
become” (180).
The third and final point of clarification, one that will require the remainder of this thesis
to narrate, reveals that unlike the religious and the secular, which at any given point represent the
contingent cohesion of various sensibilities, attitudes, embodiments and ways of being,
transcendence and immanence are referentially interdependent. As theological terms, as literary
tropes, and as embodied experiences, transcendence and immanence bear immense symbolic
weight in both religious and secular spheres. This thesis identifies an urgent need for rethinking
the traditional dichotomy between religion-transcendence and secular-immanence: a move that

complicates the political horizon of postsecular criticism.

If “a reconfigured history of the profession” of literary studies takes, as per Michael
Kaufmann, “the dynamic and recursive relationship between the secular and the religious as an
object of inquiry rather than the stable grounds upon which that inquiry is based” (615), then
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postsecular criticism must necessarily maintain a synchronous commitment to historically
informed ideology critique and (reformed) formalism. Separating the two risks reifying the
divide between secularism as a consolidation of this-worldly space-time and religion as
privatized, creative enterprise of interpretation and belief. Generative futurities can only spring
from historical consciousness inasmuch as all acts of meaning making partake in the past
contexts that bring them into being. Yet Kaufmann’s call remains easier to issue than to answer,
precisely because of way in which anti-foundationalist thought destabilizes all foundations. In
this sense, the “post” in postsecular modifies something that doesn’t exist or act in the world in
the way that any single historic account imagines it to, but nevertheless “governs our attempts to
describe that world” (Coviello and Hickman 651)
So theory has a way of circling back to the foundational problem of reference and logic.
What seem like inconsistencies in Asad’s line of critique—his reductive judgment of secularism
when “the secular is neither singular nor stable” (25), his materialist rendering of religion as it is
lived, sensed, and embodied (which reproduces the kind of explanatory naturalization and
socialization that he deems secularist)—in fact illuminate a dilemma of self-reference at the core
of Western epistemology. At issue is how thought composes thematics, and what thinking must
become to overcome them. Anthropology has previously confronted the problem in terms of a
debate over “rationality” versus “relativism.” Rational explanation of other societies and

cultures was said to reductively master their values and categories for present cognitive purposes.
Counterarguments stated that rational analysis itself always shifted according to its limited
parameters and that its heuristics need not entail judgements on the objects being analyzed.
Across disciplinary boundaries, the modal disjuncture between the act of analyzing and the
object of analysis spawned related controversies over the “knowing subject and observed object,
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abstraction and the concrete world, theory and lived experience, [and] the universal and the
local” (McLennan, “Postsecular Turn” 16).
In consequence, critics such as Gregor McLennan question the specifically postcolonial,
postsecular force of scholarship that uncover the violence dealt by rational, scientific, or secular
representations of the religious. McLennan’s skepticism, while perspicacious, forgets the
forward face of theory. Attempts to transcend the paradox of self-reference, whether they
subscribe to secular, intra-secular, or postsecular outlooks, cannot help but profess an
ineradicable religiousness. Žižek sums up the challenge in Lacanian terms when he states that
self-referential “gentrifications” of the “‘presymbolic Real’ only generate, as a precipitate or
‘remainder’ of the process, the very ‘outside’ of the Real […] they attempt to master” (Wolfe,
“posthumanism” xx). Stated differently, self-exceeding (and perhaps all of meaning-making)
necessarily involves a leap of faith from the infinitude of what could become to the fathomability
of what ever so fleetingly is. The lingering presence of the other-wise compels belief at the core
of all systems, a condition of the mind that makes “it […] impossible not to believe in God” (qtd.
in Benson). That, from no less a pen than Lacan’s.

With respect to all the major issues that postsecularism has begun to track, Indigenous
Studies can claim to have always-already been there. From its foundation, the United States has

preached an institutionalized secularism, which, as a negative right, found expression as the
citizen’s right to “free exercise.” Tisa Wenger notes that for Native Americans, religious
freedom has long been an elusive and problematic goal, not least because missionary
establishments wielded undue influence over the policies of the Bureau of Indian Affairs up until
the 1920s. In We Have a Religion, Wenger focuses on the role that the Pueblo dance

16
controversies played in the demise of the missionary establishment at the BIA. Against all odds,
the Pueblo had preserved and protected its dance tradition since Spanish arrival. As a ritual
practice, dances served a number of social functions, including the marking of seasons. Pueblo
Traditionalists seeking first amendment protections had thought that legal protection would
protect the dance from the kind of historical hostilities that the tribe was familiar with. What
First Amendment protection brought instead was a host of unprecedented challenges from within
and without.
If only Deloria could’ve traveled back in time to offer the Pueblo traditionalists the
insight that “The First Amendment was [only] designed to keep Christians from killing each
other” (Red Earth, White Lies 30). The amendment had not been designed with “a handful of old
Indians […] saying prayers in the California High Country” or “another handful […] ingesting
some peyote buttons in a remote setting in Oregon” in mind, and it is precisely the First
Amendment that the future Supreme Court will lean on to absolve the United States of the
responsibility of respecting tribal sacred space/practice, lest the government “favors” any one
religion (Red Earth, White Lies 30). Following legal recognition, Pueblo Tribal leaders found
themselves struggling to isolate the parts of their culture deemed “religious” from all other
spheres of life, including politics and economics. Redefining their dance as “religion” stripped
tribal leaders of their authority to enforce communal participation, for what had always been

treated like a kind of community work was now reconfigured as a matter of individual
conscience. Public controversy attracted uninformed outside intervention as well. Moralizing
missionaries confronted reformers whose understandings of the dance were no less fantastic
(Wenger 136). The actual dance itself turned out to be of secondary concern. “Left in the lurch
by a society that crave[d] participation in their ceremonials” but couldn’t respect their religion
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for what it was (Deloria, Red Earth, White Lies 30), Pueblo traditionalists quickly became privy
to the way in which the secular state recognized religions based on their formal proximities to the
one “legitimate” religion, Christianity. A plethora of early American texts demonstrate that
America’s secular self image emerged in direct reaction to Puritan anxieties over Indigenous
“encroachment.” Indigenous “magic” and its close cousin, “witchcraft,” provided a negative
canvas on which colonial America articulated its supreme rationality and its natural right to an
“Indian wilderness.”3 Wenger reveals only the tip of the iceberg when she states that Indigenous
religious freedom “continue[s] to challenge the limits of dominant notions about what counts as
‘religion’ in American public discourse” (xiv).4
Within the modern day North American academy, the avowedly secular thrust of theory
has placed Indigenous studies in an awkward spot. As Craig Womack notes in Red on Red
(1999), Indigenous scholars never fully bought into the dogmas of deconstruction, for they knew
certain essentialisms to be crucial to their lived experiences and their self-understandings (4).
The postmodern decree that there can be no such thing as an uncompromised “native
perspective” had always seemed dangerously complicit with the homogenizing aim of
assimilationist ideology. The legitimization of Native American literary separatism, then, rests
on the fraught project of asserting an Indigenous “critical center” amid a theoretical landscape
that adamantly denies the existence of any centers. Womack outlines two prerequisites for

The Salem Witch Trials famously resulted in widespread mistrust of religious “fanaticism,” which in turn
solidified the future U.S. government’s self-understanding as a secular institution. For an account of how political,
proprietary, and border instability contributed to the events of the witch trials, see Emerson W. Baker’s A Storm of
Witchcraft. “Indian wilderness” is a phrase that comes from one of hundreds of publications produced by Cotton
Mather, an influential New England clergyman. His history narrative, Magnalia Christi Americana, sheds light on
how thinkers of the time summoned Indigenous customs and practices to define colonial social space.
4
For Deloria, the Western “contempt” for Indigenous religions stems from the temporal concepts and doctrines
of Christianity (God is Red 74), which restricts God to “a particular mode of operation and sequence of appearance”
(266). Such a mode of narration, when formalized as history, leads to the naturalization of a “traditional American
identity” predicated on progress (73).
3
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separatist criticism, the first of which calls on scholars of Native literatures to rethink the binary
between authentic (traditional) orality and contaminated (modern) literacy. Second is the need to
recognize the inherent politics of Indigenous literatures as manifested in their mimetic function.
“Native artistry is not pure aesthetics, or art for art’s sake,” argues Womack, “as often as not
Indian writers are trying to invoke as much as evoke. The idea behind ceremonial chant is that
language, spoken in the appropriate ritual contexts, will actually cause a change in the physical
universe” (16-17). In this light, a self-reflective postsecular approach to Indigenous literatures
perforce allies itself with the fight for literary and political separatism. The interpretive paucity
(and predictability) of critical frames such as “magical” realism, “fantasy,” and “mythology,”
into which Indigenous stories frequently get cast, speak to the urgent need to revisit the secularist
assumptions of regnant methodologies.
Furnishing a cohesive interpretive frame that respects Indigenous singularity without
sliding into bad faith metaphysics and exclusionary logic, however, is easier said than done. To
address this dilemma, the historian Dipesh Charkrabarty offers a useful anti-historicist vision.
Wishing for the obsolescence of his own discipline, he argues that a new analytic of so-called
“religion” located outside of the boundaries of Europe needs to think beyond history. History and
historicism, in his conception, reduces events, agencies, and societies all different from each
other to an empty, homogeneous common measure that all too easily ossifies into a “natural”

mode of existence (23). Naturalized history always betrays a historicism that seeks to discipline
and colonize, given the disturbing genealogy of the science of nature and the natural.5 Hence
Chakrabarty argues that “the ‘naturalization’ of history and its ontology should be resisted, partly
because they entail a teleological political imperialism in which the past is necessarily tied to a
5

During the Enlightenment, distinguishing between the natural and unnatural became the privileged way of
classifying racial and sexual identity (Morton 16).
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modern/modernist present and future, whose privileged origin and source of dissemination is the
West” (McLennan 14). Escaping the developmental-modernist tropes of historicism requires
receptivity to radically different ontologies, of which the observer must suspend any judgments
on validity. This analytical standard expands into three important methodological principles
when it comes to writing and thinking about religion. First, supernatural entities must necessarily
be treated as active agents in the lives and practices of non-European religious cultures. Second,
cultural “translation” must arise from a new politics that does not pass cultural phenomena,
belief and experience “through some neutral superior set of terms designed, in fact, to establish
the subordination of these phenomena to alien (secular) norms” (McLennan 15). Third, and
perhaps most important, disjunctive temporalities must be preserved through the utilization of
separate genealogies.
Even with such a schema in hand, analyzing “pre-modern” or “non-modern” religious
phenomena proves exceedingly difficult. Taylor shows just why in a section in his book that
narrates the secular subject’s inability to comprehend religious alterity. Tellingly, he turns to the
imaginative realm of literature to illustrate the experience of living within the immanent frame.
What makes Othello a tragedy, and not just a tale of misfortune, is that we hold its
protagonist culpable in his too-ready belief of the evidence fabricated by Iago. He
had an alternative mode of access to her innocence in Desdemona herself, if he

could only have opened his heart/mind to her love and devotion. The fatal flaw in
the tragic hero Othello is his inability to do this, imprisoned as he is in a powerful
code of honour. (Taylor 568)
What’s interesting about this passage isn’t what Taylor argues, but what gets unconsciously
reproduced by his analogy. Having been universalized into a metaphor for all secular
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subjectivities, Othello loses that most important defining trait of his—his alterity. Meanwhile,
the sign of Desdemona animates a cultural trope that so often surfaces in polemics against the
religious practices of the Other, the feminine seducer. Early modern witchcraft narratives and
treatises, for example, are replete with descriptions of witches as seductive temptresses.6
Likewise, feminized Indigeneity surfaces as a stock trope in colonial American texts, seducing
the upright frontiersman to compromise his morals and “go native.”7 What Taylor’s passage
nakedly demonstrates is the way in which historical writing already invests power into its form.
The “significance of [unrealized] discoveries and the melancholy of dominance” that Vizenor
identifies as tropes of dominant “simulations” remains untouched and unbothered in Taylor’s
story of the secular subject (11). The result is that the differential features of Othello and
Desdemona get pressed into a totality of pasts undergone. Even the most astute critic of the
secular cannot prevent description from slipping into prescription.
The main problem, as secularist skeptics might put it, is that “by all the criteria of
comprehension available to us,” Other people (their experiences of and relationships with the
Other-world notwithstanding) “are not living in a different time and a different world”
(McLennan 15). According to them, critics living in this-world must, one way or another, come
to terms with “the utter historicity of things — ourselves as ‘dying organisms’, our societies and
ideas, indeed nature itself, and even nature’s laws” (McLennan 15). This thesis does not pretend

to adjudicate this dispute. Instead, it focuses on the storied nature of both sides of the debate. At
the end of the day, the contest between the secular and the postsecular boils down into a contest
between stories. “The truth about stories is that that’s all we are,” says the Cherokee-Canadian

Cotton Mather’s witchcraft narratives are a wonderful example, though plenty of witchcraft pamphlets
published in Europe exhibit the same cultural habits.
7
See Ronald Takaki, “The Tempest in the Wilderness: The Racialization of Savagery” for a succinct overview.
6
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author and critic Thomas King (The Truth About Stories 12). The moral death-of-god story has
strong structural backers in science and western epistemology. All three like to present their
arguments as discoveries that come to “us” when “we” let go of our irrational, servile, blinkered
view of the world. All accounts surreptitiously consolidate modern liberal identity within a
natural order of things. Facing the institutional narratives of the secular stands the Other, who
understands that “immanent” western modernity derives its power from its own “transcendent”
visions of the good: empirical scientific knowledge, individualism, negative freedom, and
rationality. In the name of the good, so much can be tolerated, even spirituality and religion. “we
understand that we clear cut forests not to enrich the lives of animals but to make profit. We
know that we dam(n) rivers not to improve water quality but to create electricity and to protect
private property” (King, The Truth About Stories 27). It is at this juncture that literature and
literary studies is asked to respond. Doubtless, neither can afford not stay mute.
So this thesis prepares to stage an intervention. I admit that no matter the explanatory
reach of any analytic apparatus, there will always be experiences, especially those pertaining to
other-worldly contact, that remain too out there, too Other, to be analyzed or even comprehended
in a meaningful way. Instead of repressing or ignoring such a reality, I lean into it. Thomas
King’s 1993 novel Green Grass, Running Water offers the perfect platform—if one could call it
that—for thinking about the always incomplete, and therefore always productive, past, present

and future of postsecular critique. And now, without further ado, the water.
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2

SLIPPERY WHEN WET OR ICY OR GASEOUS

“But there is water everywhere” (King, Green Grass 469). The observing subject coolly
contemplates its own aquatic constitution and expresses it as a fraction: two-thirds. This much is
known, meaning this much is measured and contained and bottled and sold. Secular knowing,
that most essential human labor that justifies intellectual property in the act of creating it,
cunningly forgets the priority relations that birthed it. In the beginning there was the knowledge
of the self, independent of external reality. Then came the knowledge of observable reality as
neutral fact. Neutral facts annealed into natural order, and only then did modern, god-less
subjects, make cautious theoretical references to transcendence. In this way holy water became
the universal solvent. But the problem, as “I” puts it to Coyote, is that “There are no
truths…Only stories” (King, Green Grass 391)—stories we live and think and die by. “Be
careful with the stories you tell” cautions the author as essayist, as another “I” (The Truth about
Stories 10), “And you have to watch out for the stories that you are told” (10). The most fraught
of all stories may very well be the story of “we.” The exclusionary syntax of knowing all too
easily transmogrifies into racial metaphysics, so whatever stories “we” tell ourselves now cannot
afford the naïve transcendent signification of a “we,” and neither can it assume the immanent
self-sufficiency of the Enlightenment “I.” Descartes ’famous dictum notwithstanding, the more
one thinks, the more the separation of the “I” from a “we” seems arbitrary,8 so a good story
always circles back to the “zero point” of storytelling, the relationality of I-We. And here’s how
that happens, says this chapter, in the mind of one very slippery “I”.

8

And to be fair to the Western intellectual tradition, thinkers like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have said as
much.
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2.1

“So.”
Thomas King’s novel Green Grass, Running Water (1993) willingly takes on the risk of

summoning many a “we” as it narrates a multiplicity of worlds running through the hard borders
of secular ontology. The preceding chapter demonstrated the descriptive breadth of
postsecularism as a mode of historical narration, and also shed light on the limits of such
narratives, for they prove lacking as a tool of understanding lived experience. The fossilizing
gaze of historicism limits its modus operandi to one of excavation. Events occurring outside of
“this-worldly” time and the experiences of those whose lived worlds are the first world will not
yield to the sequential uncovering of historical analysis.9 Postsecularism as an interpretive
heuristic requires more than just the story of how “this-world” came to be in time—it requires
insight into the individual’s experience of and beyond that world. What’s being asked for here
isn’t simple disciplinary addition, for cobbling together the historicized consciousness of a social
“we” with the interiority of the individual “I” merely reinscribes Asad’s description of
secularism’s political metaphysic. Yet for as long as the “I” finds intelligibility through the
linguistic, epistemological, and cultural commons inhered within a “we,” thinking through their
distinction will lead to entanglements of increasing complexity. As a story about stories, Green
Grass begins and ends with this conundrum. Interpenetrating tall tales intervene in a story line of
“this-world,” recursively and reflexively exposing their own storiedness by coming back to the

scene of their own staging. More than just being a text about the postsecular, Green Grass

The usage of the word “world” in this chapter is deliberately imprecise so that the term can straddle the
secularist, material world and any number of other inhabited worlds. This chapter will frequently summon secular
humanist dichotomies between this-world and the other-world, the natural and the supernatural. It must be
emphasized that the usage of those terms does not imply endorsement, but rather represents an attempt to explicate
out from a secularist starting point, which, as any intellectually honest postsecular critic will admit, is wholly
inevitable and necessary. To specify further, this-world, in the context of Green Grass, encompasses the direct
spatial correspondences that occur between Green Grass and the “real world” outside the text, which index the
penetration of modern secularity in its various (epistemological, cultural, political, ideological, etc.) guises.
9
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embodies and performs postsecular critique; this chapter clarifies the terms of the novel’s
mercurial I-We embodiments and in doing so, attempts to summon a postsecular interpretive
horizon wherein Indigenous “supernatural” storytelling performs (and thereby powers) its way
through and beyond both naturalized history and historicized nature.
“So. In the beginning, there was nothing, Just the water” (1). The opening line of Green
Grass frames the framing narrative of the novel, by way of introducing the entity that predates
all existence—water. The linguist and the semiotician will no doubt notice that the word “water”
actually occurs at the very end of its signifying chain, which technically isn’t even the first
sentence; the conjunction “so” stands alone, before all else, seemingly transcendent in its
narrative effect of flipping the switch. At the same time, there exists a congruence between
grammatical function (where a conjunction relates one syntactic unit to another) and pragmatic
implication (where a discourse marker, broadly conceived, relates a speaker to a listener) that
concentrates a great degree of immanent power within “so.” So what came first, water or
discourse? The ensuing sentence muddles the question further with the temporally ambiguous
insertion of Coyote: “Coyote was there, but Coyote was asleep” (1). The question of who came
first, it appears, doesn’t really matter in this space. The narrator, at the end of the same
paragraph, reveals their embodiment in an “I,” but offers nothing else in the way of
personification. However one chooses to think of the “I,” whether as a Lacanian “I” or as an

embodied isolate or simply as a first person narrator, a few things remain incontrovertible, that
the “I” instigates storytelling, that as far as the storytelling performative is concerned, “I” comes
into existence at the same time as water and Coyote, and that “I” exists in a “privileged,”
originary relationship with the two.
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In oral communication, “so” prefaces “sequence-initiating actions and…indicate the
status of the upcoming action as ‘emerging from incipiency ’rather than being contingent on the
immediately preceding talk” (Bolden 974). Because its rhetorical function presumes a speaker
and an audience, the utterance of “so” by definition gives birth to Coyote and “their” (it must be
noted the novel never refers to Coyote with a pronoun, gendered or otherwise) interlocutor “I.”
What’s more, “I” already seems poised to split up into another “we,” as implied through verb
conjugation. The use of the third-person singular verb ending in “I says” is something that “I”
maintains throughout the entirety of the novel; the fact that “I” does not conjugate similar verbs
in the same manner, as seen in “I tell Coyote. ‘Sit down[…]’” (113), suggests that the idiolectic
expression isn’t entirely innocent. The verb “say,” perhaps more so than “tell” and surely more
so than ‘speak,’ ‘declare’ or ‘respond,’ calls attention to the provisionality and contingency of
transitory speech acts. By implying a third person subject in “I says,” “I” walks a fine line
between the orality of a narrator/storyteller and the textuality of a character/reader. Like a
recursive function always poised to branch off into more discourse formations, the storytelling
“I” entails an infinitude of possible “we” configurations.
One can picture “I” and Coyote floating, undifferentiated, in the ocean of the presymbolic
real, but doing so would disintegrate all discourse. Astrida Neimanis offers a compelling
alternative vision in Bodies of Water (2017), in which “water […] is facilitative and directed

towards the becoming of other bodies. Our own embodiment […] is never really autonomous.
Nor is it autochthonous, nor autopoietic” (3). “Really” bears surprisingly heavy weight as a
qualifier, and in her work Neimanis leans on the sometimes porous border between really and
kind of in order to conceptualize and thematize, a strategic maneuver that is familiar to readers of
posthumanist theory. Neimanis’ thematization of “posthuman gestationality” makes room for
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bodies that are of each other and not each other. This thesis borrows Neimanis’ figuration of
gestationality and magnifies its aporetic core. Posthumanist figurations afford space for
ambiguity, uncertainty, and the unknown, a feature of obvious importance in dealing with “otherworldly” matters. Without the capacity to factor in temporal ambiguity, gestational logic would
devolve into a recitation of who begot whom, which, in “I” and Coyote’s watery world, makes
very little sense.
Fittingly, the one event in the framing narrative of Green Grass that proceeds according
to a derivative logic produces “G O D,” the progenitor of all Western preoccupations with
origins. Coyote has a dream that right away demonstrates its embodiment with all the noise it
makes. In two consecutive encounters, Coyote Dream comes to recognize itself through
differentiation. First, it sees the water, in which it perceives a reflection of its own eyes. “Those
Dream Eyes” speak back to confirm that what the dream sees is in fact water (1). If the Dream
Eyes went on to create further stories, filling out their own fractal pattern of discursive selfrecognition, that branch of stories is lost. Coyote Dream recognizes that it has no control over the
water; having had its dream of commanding the world shattered, it wakes up Coyote with its
many sad noises. Seeing that it shares a self-recognizing intelligence with Coyote (“I am very
smart” emphasis added, 2), the dream confuses itself for Coyote, until Coyote sets it straight by
naming it “dog” (2). As a signifier, “dog” manifests the novel’s first tentative expression of

hierarchy, for it refers to a lesser version of Coyote. The cultural presuppositions that place the
domesticated dog under the wild Coyote in the hierarchy of beings is, in turn, a product of
romanticism, which imagined untamed, original nature as a repository for authenticity (Morton
29-78). Perhaps Coyote thought of this symbolic history when they named the dream “dog.”
Perhaps Coyote simply meant to effect differentiation through commonality: Canis Lupus
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Familiaris and Canis Latrans sprang forth from the same genus, after all. Though Coyote leaves
the interpretation of their nomenclature open ended (their exasperation with dog by no means
entails discipline or hierarchical order), it is clear what dog thinks about its new name. Thinking
is what does him in: “when that Coyote Dream thinks about being a dog, it gets everything
mixed up” (2). The cogito that declares “I am” cannot handle the self-alienation brought on by its
autopoietic logic. “I’m in charge of the world” takes for granted that I’m in charge of myself, and
in effort to assert the latter, dog’s thinking inverts dog’s name to god. “I don’t want to be a little
god […] I want to be a big god!” cries god (3), willing itself into larger stature, a change that gets
inscribed into the latest iteration of what is now unmistakably his name, “G O D” (3). His
command over textual authority thus consolidated, Judeo-Christian G O D turns his attention
back to the water, and so begins all the troubles of this-world.
Evidently, events in the other-world of Green Grass have a way of fundamentally
disrupting categorical in-grouping and out-grouping. The discrete individualism of an I might
bubble up to make discourse legible, but who belongs to whom is not a question that needs
asking when “I,” Coyote, Coyote Dream, and water all exist outside of time, and together as a
single performative-interpretive unit bring the totality of storied worlds into being with the
discourse marker “So.” Thus arises a need to distinguish what goes on in the ideal form of
storytelling, an I-We “relationality” or “gestationality” that resists conceptualization in this-

world. This-worldly, secular discourse assumes a Me-You relational structure between
autonomous Enlightenment subjects. What this chapter will refer to as the storytelling “expanse”
theorizes a place that contains the storytelling performative-interpretive. Broader, less fixed, and
more multivalent than a narrative plane, it factors in interpretive/performative self-consciousness
as well as a bidirectional liminality between I and We. When the I-We storytelling expanse
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intersects with the Me-You narrative plane, borders get crossed, meanings get destabilized, linear
time gets scrambled, and what was blocked resumes to flow. And yet. The I-We expanse never
presumes independence from, or higher/holier status over, the Me-You plane, for what other than
the ordering principles of syntax, the this-worldly significations of lexemes, the pragmatics of
discourse, and the history of the English language enables the legibility of the other-world of
Green Grass in this-world? Not that there are any hard and fast boundaries between this-world
and other-worlds; being that so much of the English language encodes a historical impulse to
disappear the other-worldly in favor of a well-ordered mechanistic cosmos (a trajectory that has
been in place since the Enlightenment), the differentiation between this-world and other-worlds
remains a useful and necessary one, if only to confront the hard edged binaries of
phallogocentrism.
Revisiting the elemental mechanics of meaning formation might help cut through some of
the haze surrounding I-We gestationality. A readymade cognitive map groups together “we” with
transcendence, and “I” with immanence. Transcendence and “we,” (at least in the way that they
are habitually associated) are both metaphoric signs, whereas immanence and “I” are metonymic
expressions in that they emanate discrete individualism (a prerequisite of contiguity) and
diachrony (within this-wordly, linear time). The classic schematization of the symbolic
process—courtesy of Ferdinand de Saussure—arranges metonymic combinations sequentially

along a horizontal axis, while the transcendent associations of metaphor align vertically, in an
imaginative stack.10 Any honest linguist or semiotician will note, however, that even the simplest
metonym makes use of antirealist “poetry.” To enable the “the crown” to stand in for the

10

As is well known, Saussure never explicitly names metaphor or metonymy, and instead refers to syntagmatic
and paradigmatic relations within language. It is Viktor Shklovsky’s formulation of prosaic (mundane) metonymy,
and poetic (other-worldly) metaphor that enables Structuralist analysis to institute the by-now-unproblematic
interchangeability between syntagmatics-metonymy and paradigmatics-metaphor.
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monarch, metonymy sacrifices the sign of the monarch and imaginatively transforms it. In the
same vein, for metaphor to mean, it depends on the sequential, contiguous placement of distinct
semantic units. Put simply, metaphor functions metonymically, and vice versa. Mathematics
dictates that two mutually constitutive sets can only be identical, so it follows that metaphor and
metonymy are one and the same by definition. Even so, the reality of the symbolic process
necessitates their difference, otherwise this sentence would reduce to a jumble of letters with no
emergent meaning. The paradox of mutual constitution disrupts hierarchy and linear time—the
two things necessary to constitute a story about who belongs to whom, or who begets whom. A
generative paradox radiates out from metaphor-metonymy to transcendence-immanence, and to
I-We (though not in order).
Living at the porous interface between I and We thus requires a leap of faith. Belief
surpasses the tepid provisionality of “both are possible” and “both may be true”; it calls for a
firm commitment to mutually exclusive truth claims and an unconditional embrace of the Other,
the something-out-there that reconciles paradox.11 Belief, in other words, reflexively relates,
feels, analyzes and performs. It traverses the social and the affective, but not at the expense of
logic. In this way belief distinguishes itself from fanaticism, which imposes, declares, and enacts.
Fanaticism just as likely occurs inside a reeducation camp as it does inside a church. The central

11

Though a logical embrace of paradox resists conceptualization, it may be surprisingly easy (trivial, as
mathematicians like to say) to model visually. An old episode of Cosmos (one that I have failed to locate despite my
best efforts) once showed Carl Sagan passing a three-dimensional potato through two-dimensional paper. For
inhabitants of the two-dimensional world, the constantly shapeshifting cross-section of the potato would pose the
gravest intellectual challenge. Viewers in the three-dimensional world, however, would easily see that the totality of
the potato resolves the irreconcilable contradictions that mark two-dimensional observations. To tie this illustration
back to the history of literary criticism, one could argue that the bad faith orthodoxy of the New Critics arose from
their pretension of having access to the organic unity of the potato. Reflexive postsecular critique would make no
such claims.
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dilemma of postsecular storytelling becomes one of realizing the performative-interpretive of IWe in the wake of the burning bush of phallogocentrism.

Linguistic dilemmas readily compound into a host of social dilemmas, and every
Indigenous character in Green Grass confronts a confluence of vocabularies, stories, and cultural
products that have already defined them according to a racial metaphysic that pits RationalCultured-Ascendant-White against Superstitious-Ecological-Disappearing-Indian. The concept
of the “Indian” is the principal example of a “terminal creed” reproduced ad infinitum in the
dominant cultural simulations of America. As Vizenor explains, “The word Indian […] is a
colonial enactment, not a loan word, […] an occidental invention that became a bankable
simulation; the word has no referent in tribal languages or cultures” (11). The “postindian,”
which marks the “absence of the invention” (11), endures the “lies and wicked burdens of
discoveries, the puritanical destinies of monotheism […] with silence, traces of natural reason,
trickster hermeneutics, the interpretation of tribal figurations, and the solace of heard stories”
(17). The Blackfoot characters of Green Grass may lack the theoretical jargon, but they embody
Indigenous survivance with their very being. Lionel Red Dog, perennially lost and down on his
luck, sets himself on a wrong path at the young age of six, when he adopts John Wayne, “not the
actor, but the character” as his role model (King 265-6). A number of “Big Mistakes” involving

identity confusion lead him to his dead end job at Bill Bursum’s electronics store. Charlie
Looking Bear, Lionel’s cynical cousin, cashes in on the dominant culture’s idea of Indian-ness
and works as a figurehead lawyer for the consortium that has built a dam on Blackfoot land. Like
his Hollywood actor father, he finds himself haunted by misrecognition. Meanwhile Eli Stands
Alone, Lionel’s uncle and a former English professor, has returned home after a long, self-
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imposed exile to fight a lonely legal battle against the Grand Baleen Dam and its associated
development projects, for reasons that escape him.
Weaving their way in and out of the lives of the Blackfoot characters of the novel are the
stories narrated by four enigmatic “old Indians” named Lone Ranger, Ishmael, Robinson Crusoe,
and Hawkeye. Their names and their existence precede the stories that produce them, and it is
only within their respective stories that they (retroactively) reveal their Indigenous names to be
First Woman, Changing Woman, Thought Woman, and Old Woman (respectively). Two
observations argue for understanding the four women as different manifestations of one unified
entity. First is the fact that their names, spoken one after another, narrate the stages of life that a
person moves through. Second, in theory, the constitutive interdependence between the
storytelling “I” and the collaborative “we” that makes possible the performative-interpretive of
oral traditions renders the boundary between the storyteller and her audience porous, open to
bidirectional influence and movement. The framing narrative of Green Grass dramatized such
isomorphic fluidity in abundance, and there’s no reason to believe that the logic of gestational
potentiality doesn’t extend to the four women, especially when the novel paints an ambivalent
picture of their individualized embodiment:
Okay, says First Woman, and she puts on her black mask and walks to the front
gate. It’s the Lone Ranger, the guards shout. It’s the Lone Ranger, they shout

again, and they open the gate. So the Lone Ranger walks out of the prison, and the
Lone Ranger and Ishmael and Robinson Crusoe and Hawkeye head west.
(King 106)
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Where one reader might see Lone Ranger splitting into four different personalities,
another might see Lone Ranger walking up to three other storytellers that had already
been waiting outside the gate.
Embodiment continues to splinter and regroup along different storytelling axes. As “I”
and Coyote weave their way through the storytelling expanses of the four women, Coyote
observes “Old Coyote” spring into action. Strangely, nobody seems bothered by the temporal
inconsistency of Old Coyote’s name preceding the Coyote that (together with “I”) made their
existence possible in the first place. Either Coyote forgets the existence of Old Coyote, or their
conjoined identity as a “we” is so unproblematic that Coyote expresses fear when “I” lays down
some basic rules of symbolic embodiment in Thought Woman’s story:
“But there is only one Thought Woman,” says Coyote.
“That’s Right,” I says.
“And there is only one Coyote,” says Coyote.
“No,” I says. “This world is full of Coyotes.”
“Well,” says Coyote, “that’s frightening.”
“Yes it is,” I says. “Yes it is.” (King 302)
Lest one begins to think that the four storytellers are just symbols or metaphors for one woman,
initiating a slide towards a monotheistic vision of spirituality, “I” reasserts the discreteness of

Thought Woman and the self-contained integrity of her story. One is thus reminded that the four
women were embodied separately from the get-go — I-We gestationally be damned.
The discrete cultural embodiments of Lone Ranger, Ishmael, Robinson Crusoe and
Hawkeye could be said to parallel their dissimilarities as distinct Indigenous origin stories. Of
note is the fact that the story of First Woman falling from the sky is a common Seneca oral
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tradition, while Changing Woman points to a Navajo goddess, Thought Woman refers to the
Pueblo creatrix, and Old Woman “is an archetypal helper to a culture hero” that plays a central
role in Shawnee creation stories (Flick 161). For those that find the adaptation and concatenation
of different storytelling traditions an unacceptable risk, the novel offers an obvious out. Equally
conspicuous, however, is the novel’s invitation for readers to piece together their own
understandings of the four storytellers and to thereby summon their own stories. As in King’s
lecture/essay collection, The Truth About Stories, shifting the boundaries of the collective “we”
becomes a central problematic of interpretation. Because of the way in which Green Grass
refuses ontological capture, readers find themselves tasked with adjudicating which storied
interpretations pose dangers and which might open new doors.
The biggest challenge of interpretation likely falls on Indigenous readers who have to
puzzle through the differences and commonalities of divergent storytelling traditions.
Limitations on space prevent all but the most cursory discussion of the Indigenous story
traditions behind each of the four Women. At least in the context of the novel, strict tribal
distinctions become increasingly cumbersome to maintain as storytelling motifs and themes spill
over and into one another. Should grandmother turtle from First Woman’s story be understood as
the turtle on whose back Sky Woman builds the earth in Iroquis/Huron/Seneca oral traditions?
Could grandmother turtle also represent the turtle from whose back the Shawnee originated

(“Native American Legends: Sky Woman,” “Shawnee Mythology”)? A Seneca reader might
recognize the story of First Woman building an island on Grandmother Turtle’s back but find her
name confusing, for the Seneca name for “First Woman” is Iagentci, “ancient woman” or Old
Woman (“Native American Legends: Sky Woman”). Shawnee readers, in turn, might reach for
their own understanding of the creator Kokumthena, “Our Grandmother” when they first

34
encounter the name Old Woman in Green Grass (“Shawnee Mythology”), but find the lack of
correspondence between Old Woman’s story and the creation story of Kokumthena puzzling.
Navajo readers who know that “the earth and its life-giving, life sustaining, and life-producing
qualities are associated with and derived from Changing Woman” might take the presence of
water in Green Grass as a generative key (“Changing Woman”), while Laguna Pueblo readers
might do the same with their knowledge(s) of their “Mater-creatrix” variously known as Spider
Woman, Yellow Woman, and Thought Woman.
Leslie Marmon Silko’s article “Language and Literature from a Pueblo Indian
Perspective” explains how “Thought Woman, by thinking of her sisters, and together with her
sisters, thought of everything that is.” (79). For the Laguna Pueblo, words create worlds, and
“thought as knowledge informs the conception of words” (Swan 310). The Navajo articulate a
similar knowledge of language’s relationship to the world in Changing Woman’s parentage: First
Boy, her father, represents thought, while First Girl, her mother, represents speech (“Changing
Woman”). Their synthesis ensures the perpetuation of all life and living things. Further
complicating the picture are the Navajo’s own stories of Thought Woman/Spider Woman, who
acts as a helper and benefactor to humans (“Native American Legends: Spider Woman”). It is
entirely up to Indigenous readers to adjudicate the ethics of interweaving/spinning/blending
different story traditions. Green Grass performs the ever-evasive dance of staking the stories of

First Woman, Changing Woman, Thought Woman, and Old Woman firmly to Indigeneity
without tying them down to the level of tribal specificity. The degree to which the four
storytellers can be considered individual personifications of one condensed being depends in no
small part on the mutual intelligibility of their multifaceted tribal referents.
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Postsecular criticism problematizes translation. The narrative plane of this-world,
predicated on a differential epistemological-ontological foundation, exerts a horizontally
flattening effect on the omnidirectional potentialities of I-We gestationality. The
epistemological-ontological foundation is a product of Western intellectual history, kickstarted
during the Enlightenment by an instrumentalist view of language and fully clarified in Saussure’s
claim that “in language there are only differences without positive terms” (120).12 Differential
mechanics writ large as cultural habit/political metaphysic becomes “me against you” and “us
versus them.” The this-worldly storylines of Eli, Alberta, Latisha, Charlie, and Lionel illustrate
unhappy subjectivities that have been hailed into existence by a culture and an ideology that only
recognizes them as Other. Though they exceed the denotations of their signifier (“Indian”) by
simply existing, their embodied enmeshment in a complex web of institutions and ideologies
spreads them thin. A sense of exhaustion and alienation accompanies physical displacement over
inter-/intra-national borders, as illustrated in Eli’s journey to and from the University of Toronto,
Lionel’s many mishaps (especially his unintended involvement in the Wounded Knee
Occupation), and Alberta’s formative memory of border agents confiscating her father’s sacred
headdress. Physical displacement mirrors spiritual unmooring, and one might select a few
examples from Eli and Lionel’s consumption habits. Eli’s induction into Western bourgeoisie
reading society by Karen obviously leads to his self-alienation. Other societal forces are less

visible and more pernicious; the John Wayne Western that mesmerizes beholders of “The Map”
(a wall of TV displays arranged to look like North America) at Wild Bill Bursum’s electronics
store caps off the supply chain for one particularly far-reaching, vertically integrated product

It’s worth pointing out that Saussure himself fails to stick by his “new rule” and readily concedes that the
totality of the sign constitutes “something that is positive in its own class” (120). Nevertheless, poststructuralism and
deconstruction would readily absorb his radical declaration.
12
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portfolio that connects and envelops Eli (who guiltily reads the book spin off in his spare time),
Charlie, Lionel, and the four storytellers.
No “real world” character can match the scale of displacement that the four women
storytellers go through, so their stories require separate consideration. In terms of this-worldly
space, their trek from a mental institution in Florida to a Blackfoot reservation in southern
Alberta surpasses the movement range of all Blackfoot characters of the novel. Measurements of
distance mean little anyway, and the same goes for the idea of physical containment, since Dr.
Hovaugh’s hospital records reveal that the women had voluntarily left and returned to the
hospital at least thirty-seven times, some of their departures coinciding with natural disasters in
places as far off as Indonesia (Krakatoa, to be exact). To no one’s surprise, the women traverse a
multiplicity of worlds in the novel. Their other-worldly journeys occur within their respective
story cycles, and each of their story cycles are bookended by a complete storytelling
performance by “I” and Coyote, which comprises a volume.13 First Woman tells a story in which
she builds an island on Grandmother Turtle’s back where people, plants and animals all live in
relation to one another. She lives with Ahdamn, who instigates a linguistic dispute by proceeding
to name animals who already know their own names. Disagreement between Ahdamn’s freefloating signifiers and the positivized identities of the animals summons G O D, who cannot
abide disorder. Ahdamn’s clumsy attempt at classifying and naming the animals (he cycles

through microwave oven, garage sale, telephone book, and cheeseburger) immediately causes G
O D to establish proprietary rights over all that exists. He insists that “this is my world and this is
my garden” (72), and in response First Woman rebukes him for “acting as if you have no

13

Volume seems to be the most appropriate term to use here, not only because of the way that it prompts
reflection on the dialogic relationship between individual volumes (I) and the novel as a whole (we), but also
because each volume spans a complete ritualized story formula/performance.
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relations” (73). First Woman and Ahdamn leave the garden, starting a chain of events that lead to
their imprisonment at historical Fort Marion, where she disguises herself as Lone Ranger to
escape.
The second story cycle, told by the aptly named Changing Woman, introduces an
intermediary step between the biblical opening and the close at Fort Marion. Putting behind an
unpleasant encounter with a lecherous Noah, Changing woman strikes up a friendship with a
black lesbian whale named Moby Jane, and their semi-erotic romp in the ocean metaphorizes a
relational horizon that is always “swimming and rolling and diving and sliding and spraying”
(248). Captain Ahab’s ship, when it arrives, offers a predictable contrast in worldview, where a
black vs white binary and the metaphysical exigency of hunting the phallic white whale drives
Ahab and his men into a violent frenzy. “Blackwhaleblackwhalesblackwhalesbianblack
whalesbianblackwhale” lingers as a defining call for a story that ends with Changing Woman’s
transformation into, who else, but Ishmael (196).
Changing Woman’s slight variation on the story structure introduced by First Woman is
one that persists in the stories then told by Thought Woman and Old Woman. Taking a hint from
her name, one might venture that First Woman’s story dramatizes first principles: things must be
named and things must become property in order for Western thought to emerge. The knowledge
to property regime that secular modernity depends on represents the main preoccupation of the

first story cycle, so First Woman plots a straightforward transition from the Garden of Eden to
Fort Marion. Changing Woman then, modifies the formula to magnify the complicity of
literature. Whereas First Woman litters the way to Fort Marion with literary references to the
original Lone Ranger (in the form of dead rangers), Changing Woman makes her literary
references come to life in Moby Jane and Captain Ahab’s ship. Slight differences aside, the
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fundamental structure remains the same in all four story cycles, where an indeterminate female
protagonist encounters biblical figures and icons from Western literature/culture, gets defined as
an “Indian” by armed colonial forces, and consequently adopts an externally imposed
name/signifier to escape Fort Marion. For the postsecularists among their audience, each of the
stories told by the four women tell the tale of North American secularism emerging out of
European Christian tradition and in its self-possessed hubris, sacrificing the “Indian” to forget its
“superstitious” origins. Grouped together into a single storytelling performance, the four
women’s stories illustrate the historical emergence of the sign of the “Indian,” starting with
Western epistemology in the Garden of Eden, moving through colonial violence and paternalism,
and ending with Nasty Bumppo’s racial metaphysics. Secular critics, on the other hand, will hear
the stories of Ishmael, Robinson Crusoe, and Hawkeye and remind themselves of Mathew
Arnold’s infallible insight that with the onset of modernity, God became a literary term.
Many storytelling traditions incorporate dialogic interpretation into their forms, with
some processes subtly influencing the story while others formalizing themselves into back and
forth arguments, for example (Fitz 115-31). Interpretation holds one half of the key to the
medium’s infinite adaptability and liveliness. That audiences interpret stories needs no further
elaboration; more interesting is how a living story interprets its communal context and the world,
which of course, starts spilling into the territory of performance. What sets the story telling

“interpretive” apart from literary interpretation lies in the “nature” of storytelling as cooperative
process art, performed at the thin border between the storytelling-interpreting I and We. As
Marshall McLuhan’s famous catchphrase goes, “the medium is the message.” The title of the
novel performs this point in miniature. “Green grass, running water” reinterprets and reforms a
historical trope wherein the U.S. government used variations on the phrase “as long as the grass
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is green and the waters run” in their treaties with Indigenous tribes to signal the permanence of
treaty rights. The original phrase anchors its textual authority in two ontological claims: grass, in
essence, is green, and the nature of water is to run. In retrospect, the phrase can only be read
cynically. Who among the Indigenous signatories could’ve foreseen the white man’s
workaround—a massive technocratic bureaucracy that oversees the green-ness of the grass and
the properly utilized flow of the water? The “solution” continues an American managerial
tradition that counts upon and retroactively ensures the disappearance of the sign of the Indian,
whether by assimilation or extermination.14 The storyteller’s fix to the “solution” is surprisingly
simple: “Green grass running water” discards the ontological pretension of an is and converts
history into an indeterminate expanse for an ongoing negotiation between interpretation and
performance, between an I and a We constantly absorbing into and gestating one another.
If the track record of the four “old Indians” is any indication, even the best storytellers in
the world face steep odds if they hope to reform history, for the triumphant history of secular
modernity too, is an immensely popular narrative of long pedigree, with powerful narrators and
whole nations’ worth of captive listeners and readers. Carlton Smith, in performing discourse
analysis on Green Grass, summarizes the French theorist Michel de Certeau’s account of the
historico-textual challenge:
the speech of the other must be exiled from historical and ethnological reportage,

made “exotic,” for it is precisely that which holds the potential to destabilize the
“continuity of signs” desired by such accounts. Writing thus “produces history” as
an “archive” whose “will to power is invested in its form” and whose mission is
“the manufacture of time and reason.” (Smith 527)
See Robert Nichols’ Theft is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory (2019) for a detailed account of how
the historical process of recursive dispossession arose in the context of Anglo settler expansion in the Americas.
14
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Smith continues to circle back to discursive webs, shedding light on how narrative play in Green
Grass directs readerly attention to the reader’s own embedded perceptions. The analytic
apparatus that Smith brings to bear is a highly productive one, one that places him in relation to
an interpretive community that professes a shared interest in narrative as a cultural product
subtended by disciplinary form. Greg Bechtel reads Green Grass as a “syncretic” intervention
(with full knowledge of the term’s controversial presupposition of uncontaminated purity) in the
traditionally Christian form of fantasy. Circumventing the slippery topic of religion entirely, Ibis
Gómez-Vega invokes the neat dualism of magical realism to perform a focused generic reading,
while others have homed in on intertextuality (Laura Donaldson) or the colonial literary archive
(James Cox).
Smith’s essay represents the most sustained attempt at theorizing the “spirituality” of
Green Grass, and it’s an admirable one. His historicization of trickster scholarship begins with
the anthropological typology of Paul Radin and William Bright, and segues into Vizenor’s
critique of the anthropomorphized trickster. Vizenor’s de-humanization and narrativization of the
trickster dovetails nicely with Anne Doueihi’s turn to the semiotic realm, a move she performs to
extract the trickster from the “great story which is the history of religion” (qtd. in Smith 518).
Tisa Wenger’s We Have A Religion describe how Pueblo Indians under Spanish rule came to
refer to Catholicism simply as religión, while Franciscan missionaries, “Frustrated by the

practical difficulties of enforcing the laws against Indian ‘idolatry,’ […] began to define
indigenous practices as costumbres”(28). Indigenous people throughout Latin America continue
to refer to their traditions as customs to this day(5), and in America too, conversion to
Christianity had frequently been referred to as an act of getting one’s religion.15 As modern-day
See for instance, Charles Chesnutt’s short story “Po Sandy” (The Conjure Stories, W.W. Norton & Company,
2012) in which the “cunjuh-‘ooman” Tenie describes herself leaving conjuring behind after “getting religion” (17).
15
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federal statutes and supreme court cases make clear, the state maintains a vested interest in its
histories of religion, property, and conservation, and all three always-already inscribe the
disappearance of the “Indian.”
It stands to reason that language stages the symbolic battleground par excellence for
liberation. A key insight of Indigenous Studies is that language, in a sense, lives: it effects
change, it summons, it wills. At the same time, says the honest postsecularist, language as we
know it in this-world is categorically dead. The two truth claims need not cancel each other out.
Yet to openly embrace self-contradiction risks ridicule in the knowledge-production regime of
the academy, and even scholars as perspicacious as Doueihi, whether as a function of selfconscious storytelling or disciplinary self-defense, have so often consolidated the religious and
the spiritual into objects of “social-scientific knowledge in a way that takes for granted the
secular character of explanation itself” (Warner 210). The forceful rhetoric of Doueihi’s
antihistoricism diminishes in her concluding statement on the liberatory potential of trickster
narratives:
it is the power of signification, the possibility to mean, that the Trickster
celebrates…in the Trickster’s universe, everything is already a sign of something.
The universe is essentially linguistic and infinitely interpretable. Trickster is thus
not a sacred being, but the way the whole universe may become meaningful,

sacred, and filled with “power.” (Doueihi 309)
The final sentence stings the most in the way that it reinscribes the master trope of secularization
as narrated by Hegel, in which Christ’s death and disappearance “is no longer transcendence
from the world but transcendence into the world, understood to be constituted by nature and
finite human being” (Regan 138). Doueihi may have inverted the trope, consequently re-
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enchanting the world instead of secularizing it, but that ending too, is too easy, too facile: what
she has done is rewind the clock back to that thing she finds so intolerable, historical origin. A
more sympathetic reading will suggest that Doueihi dismantles the sign of the sacred being as a
Western construct— she ditches consolidated “being” to suffuse the universe with the “sacred.”16
But such a move surely amounts to dissolving the sign as a discrete semiotic unit itself. In a
universe where “everything is already a sign of something,” Doueihi has effectively pronounced
the trickster dead, exposing the limits of purely discursive figurations of the trickster.
Critique shouldn’t detract from the acknowledgement of debt. Postsecular criticism,
whatever it shapes up to be in Indigenous studies, stands on the shoulders of thinkers like
Vizenor and Doueihi. Quite evidently, post-structuralist concerns still wield significant influence
in literary interpretation, postsecular or not. Dislocating the received reception of a text involves
opening it up to a plurality of meanings, none of which can lay claim to the totality of
perspectives. Instead of hammering the square peg of religious metaphysics and cosmology into
the round hole of pluralism, the postsecular critic has tended to look around to ask who made the
holes round to begin with. Green Grass, with its polymorphous pegs, asks if holes are even the
right idea.
As an epistemological frame and a governing principle, pluralism has sometimes created
a troublesome proximity between postmodern analysis and liberalism. When it comes to Green

Grass, the question is how I-We gestationality distinguishes itself from E pluribus unum.
Authenticity, that wellspring of deep self-identification, is noticeably in short supply in Green
Grass. In other-worlds, authenticity obviously cannot exist, for without the discrete, bounded,

16

Though the category of the sacred does not exempt itself from the history of Christian theology either, one gets
the sense of what Doueihi is arguing.
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“real” self, who would be there to desire authenticity in the first place? That said, in secular
modernity, I and We both embody discrete individualism, and both draw sustenance from the
overconsumption of authenticity narratives. The way that Green Grass exceeds worlds can place
it in an uncomfortable position with respect to this-worldly politics. Liberation politics, for
example, has nothing to gain from Lionel’s sister Latisha when she instills nationalist
identification in her infant son by incanting “You are a Canadian. You are a Canadian. You are a
Canadian” (176). Even after she escapes the dialectic entrapment of her American husband, her
politics as the proprietor of Dead Dog Café, serving diner food with a side of self-deprecating
stereotype, is at best ambivalent, though one cannot help but admire the ingenuity of the
storyteller that brings together Indigenous survivance and other-worldly presence under a single
ironic sign.
Likewise, the fallibility of Coyote and the storytellers, who habitually revert to Western
textual and generic authority to tell their stories (pp.10-1, 220, 387 represent some overt
examples), make them rather unreliable as political allies. Green Grass just as easily dissolves
individual/collective identities as it recombines new ones. Together, the supernatural actors of
Green Grass spin a web of creative associations between the historic Fort Marion, a fictional
Blackfoot reservation in modern Canada, Cherokee idi:gawé:sdi (“to say it, one”) (Kilpatrick
xiv), and a pastiche of figures from various Indigenous traditions. Critics such as Jane Korkka

and Bechtel have tied the text’s challenge of authenticity to King’s own “hybrid” background,
which “combines two European cultures and the Native American—not Native Canadian—
Cherokee heritage, while his texts often evoke a Native Canadian Blackfoot setting” (qtd. in
Bechtel 212). Whatever the case, Green Grass, as a story that tells itself and tells on itself,
exposes the impossibility of positivized, discrete identities in the very act of summoning them.
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Postsecular criticism brings to the table the insight that one only needs to believe that there exists
such a thing as a Blackfoot or a Native American in order for one to be able to reach for it.
Summoning, in this sense, involves much more than evoking signs in the wasteland of
postmodern simulacra. It involves reaching into the subsurface of this-worldly reality and
bringing “something” up, if only momentarily. It fills Vizenorian silence with incantations,
movements, experience, and presence. In theory it makes possible the impossible positivization
of a Native American. Modifying the semiotic realm to achieve a closer correspondence with
Indigenous rituals and ceremonies might allow for a fuller realization of “shadows,” which
Vizenor explains as “that sense of intransitive motion to the referent; the silence in memories
[…] shadows are the motion that mean the silence, but not the presence or absence of entities”
(64). Likewise, Vizenor’s intuition of “shadow histories,” the felt presence of a prenarrative
identity that exceeds all stories might find their most concrete embodiment through a ritualsymbolic medium.

Summoning doesn’t always work, and even when it does, the summoned figure always
already implies its own inversion on the way becoming something else, another relation. I-We
gestationality helps simplify the picture once again. Because I and We already contain each
other, their relational logic lies outside of time, outside of this-worldly conceptualization. When

transposed onto linear, this-worldly time, their gestationality gets scrambled into an endless
chain of I → We → I figurations. An I might identify with a We, only to suffer a moment of
misrecognition that brings back the I; a We might incorporate itself into a bigger We, in which
case the initial We must categorically invert itself into an I first, narrating We→I→We. One
senses a kind of “will” or “momentum” propelling the process; in this way I-We gestationality
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helps explain the motivation that activates Vizenorian shadows. Also important to note is the fact
that the I →We chain represents a full secularization of I-We gestationality, and that it requires
no supernatural help to proceed. the storyline of Eli’s life, for example, emplots a progression
from his interpellation into bourgeoisie reading society (We), to his alienation and eventual
return (I), and finally to his participation in the Sun Dance (We). It is only with his return to
water that he breaks the chain, skipping an intermediary I in joining a radically indeterminate,
incomprehensibly other We, marking other-worldly intervention.
All considered, it becomes clear that I-We gestationality only describes—it doesn’t
execute. “Conjuration,” “divination,” “healing,” “summoning,” and “witchcraft” are the kinds of
activities that do the “dirty work” of enabling other-worldly gestationality to slip in through the
interstices. Confronting the freighted Eurocentrism of each of the terms just mentioned is beyond
the scope of this thesis, which means that interpretation will have to proceed from component
ritual elements instead of the larger categorical structures that contain them; if reference to
conjuration, divination or other such practices and their practitioners is made, it points to a
placeholder sign that future scholarship will have to reform. Unlike the jerry-rigged signs
attempting to signify them, nothing is makeshift about the Indigenous “medicomagical”
tradition. The expertise, embodied presence, and relational awareness of a good medicine man is
what prevents the indiscriminate practice of conjuration or summoning. Despite Green Grass’

inexorable disruption of boundaries and borders, the presence of ritual invites a dive into region.
The novel’s volume headings, which each encode a direction and a color in Sequoyah (Cherokee)
syllabary, and the untranslated incantations that start off First Woman’s story (after a series of
clichéd misfires) signal that the reader ignores region at their own risk (King 12).
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In his anthropological study of the sacred formulae of the “western Cherokee,” Alan
Kilpatrick describes the painstaking work he undertook to amass field notes, ritual texts, personal
letters, and personal testimonies from his informants. Though his target group is what he terms
the “western” Cherokee (members of the modern-day Cherokee Nation located in present-day
Oklahoma) his textual artifacts come from a broader geographical area, shadowing the historical
path of removal. His description of where excerpts from medicine books are “naturally” found
portrays a textual culture intimately embedded in the land:
Fragments of these esoteric texts have also come to light in the most unlikely
places: squirreled away in the trunks of dead trees, buried in jars beneath
surreptitiously marked stones, or kept as family heirlooms by the descendants of
these medicine men, who become terribly evasive when asked by strangers about
the existence of such manuscripts. One suspects that a considerable number of
these medicine books may yet be hidden away in rural northeastern Oklahoma or
in the Smokey Mountain region of Tennessee and North Carolina.17 (Kilpatrick
24)
The idea of region is an imperfect but useful one because all idi:gawé:sdi begin with a process of
self identification, and for the Cherokee, “region” provides the grounds for identification. Region

A postsecular critique of Kilpatrick’s monograph could and should be an essay in of itself. Read against the
grain, Kilpatrick’s ethnographic and methodological accounts narrate the story of a scholar repeatedly brushing up
against disciplinary boundaries, but ultimately choosing to avoid confrontation (a pattern that Kilpatrick might
attribute to the Cherokee preference for reaching agreements). His literature review draws a straight line from King
James’ dissertation on demonology to the emergence of witchcraft as an analytical category in anthropology.
Despite his keen awareness of cultural and phenomenological differences, Kilpatrick adopts the Eurocentric
categories of his discipline with very little protest. From his personal anecdotes it seems clear that he respects, and to
some extent believes in the power of conjuration, healing, and divination; one cannot help but wonder if a subtext
exists beneath his descriptions of himself “managing” informant resistance or paging through uprooted idi:gawé:sdi
in the Bienecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Yale (ironically, Yale had purchased its collection from
Kilpatrick’s own parents, who were also anthropologists of Cherokee descent).
17
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marks the intersection between space and ulanigvgv, “energy deriving from such phenomena as
lightning and running water and from spiritual beings, including animals […] human beings and
certain plants and materials objects” (Fogelson qtd. in Irwin 255). Language too, ties itself to
place/space, as reflected in the names of the two dominant surviving Cherokee dialects such as
the Eastern and Overhill (or what is now simply known as Oklahoma Cherokee) dialects (“The
Cherokee Nation and its Language” 12). Within his rather unusual classification of “western
Cherokee” (which by all indications appear equivalent to Oklahoma Cherokee) Kilpatrick also
differentiates a number of sub-dialects with names such as “cherry tree place,” “Echota place,”
and “thread place” (Kilpatrick 45), reminding readers of Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s insight
that Indigenous peoples are those with languages and stories that tell “how we/they came to be a
place” (6). Indeed, Kilpatrick notes considerable stylistic differences between “western” (or
Overhill/Oklahoma) Cherokee idi:gawé:sdi and their more formally conservative eastern
counterparts (recovered from parts of North Carolina), and he cautiously imputes the “literary
balkanization” of western idi:gawé:sdi to the trauma caused by historic removal. Precise nominal
identification at the start of an idi:gawé:sdi thus not only locates the supplicant and their clan,
but also exposes “the essence of his personality upon which spiritual action may be taken”
(Kilpatrick 29).
Moving on, the following stages of idi:gawé:sdi involve the “invocation of supernatural

forces […] The actualization of magic through the use of time-conflating adverbial modifiers and
[…] the vehicle of color symbolism […and] The stabilization or homeostasis of the spell
achieved through imperative commands” (Kilpatrick 28). In this context, it makes sense that
Lone Ranger’s story cycle couldn’t begin until she invoked her Indigenous name, First Woman,
in Cherokee: “Higayv:ligé:i” (King 12). Non-metaphoric correspondences between idi:gawé:sdi
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and the ritual incantations presented in Green Grass, however, must stop there. To reconstruct a
loose translation of the incantations based on Kilpatrick’s monograph would miss the point, for
when it comes to transformational language, its inaccessibility is the point.18 Forcing the
translation of a text that one has not related their way into commits the interpretive equivalent of
cultural theft and displacement. There are concerns beyond ethics as well: the idea of extracting
an interpretive key from the Sequoyah syllabary betrays a romanticized notion of Cherokee ritual
texts as a source of ultimate authenticity. As Kilpatrick explains, the corpus of idi:gawé:sdi
reflects “an amalgamation of diverse cultural influences that were introduced over time” (42)
including Muskogean and (possibly) Natchez and Choctaw loanwords, phrases, and concepts.
Most intriguing is Kilpatrick’s claim that “A surprising number of Cherokee ritual specialists
[…] professed Christianity during their lifetimes […] as a result […] infusing their magical texts
with such Christian elements as ‘amen ’and ‘in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost!’”
(41). Once more, discrete autonomy teases its presence, only to dissolve away.
So how do regionally embedded Cherokee ritual texts reflect on Green Grass? What
commentaries do they provide on the act of interpretation? As long as interpretation involves the
symbolic realm, bringing idi:gawé:sdi to bear involves metaphorization. One must pause here.
Didn’t Cutcha Risling Baldy so powerfully argue against just such a move when she said
“Coyote is not a metaphor?” (1). In her essay, she explains how Western anthropologists and

philosophers tend to classify Coyote as a universal trickster archetype, which subordinates
“Coyote First Person” to a narrative of evolving human consciousness (16). Put differently,
Western interpretations of Coyote have turned Coyote First Person into a sacrificial vehicle for

“transformational language […] replete with ritualisms, archaisms, loan words, and unusual verb forms […]
can bear as little resemblance to ordinary Cherokee discourse as Chaucer’s Old English does to the writings of
James Joyce” (Kilpatrick 25).
18
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the tenor that is historical progress. The universalization of “Coyote First Person separates
Coyote First Person from his/her people and his/her land and erases an important intent of
Coyote’s stories — to establish an everlasting connection and responsibility to the land and its
inhabitants” (16). Baldy takes pains to explicate the constitutive link between Coyote First
Person’s stories and Coyote First Person as an embodiment of Indigenous epistemologies, so it
should be noted that when Baldy says Coyote First Person’s stories “intend” to (re)establish an
inseverable connection between indigeneity and land, she speaks in metaphor. In this light, the
title of her essay acts more as a rhetorical gesture than a truth claim. Viewed from a radically
different angle, however, one might say that Baldy speaks literally from within a knowledgebelief system where Coyote First Person’s stories intend in the same way that words can mean,
and thereby create. In either case, what Baldy unequivocally declares to Western social science is
that Coyote is not your metaphor, which befits the way that Other worlds avail themselves in this
world. In “Godzilla vs. Post-Colonial,” King explains how “associational literature” guards its
secrets: “For the non-native reader, this literature provides a limited and particular access […]
allowing the reader to associate with that world without being encouraged to feel part of it"
(188). One could imagine a kind of cryptography where the message changes and re-encrypts
itself as it is being read. The unlocking of new meanings requires that the right person with the
right relations and the right code knows where to look.

Some might characterize the mode of reading and writing just described as spiritually
charged obscurantism. That is fine and well. Detractors will also point out that Baldy summons
Indigenous metaphysics in her articulation of an eternal connection between Indigenous people
and their lands, and thereby commits a universalization of her own. Between her relentless
questioning of universal “truth” and “fact,” and her invocation of an inseverable, everlasting
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connection to land, the same critics will spot the kind of inconsistency that cause many “working
within a wide range of different forms of critical theory [to] impute to Indigenous peoples a
mystifying exoticism that belies their intellectual contributions” (Nichols 12). Postsecularism as
interpretive methodology doesn’t belittle secular critique. Rather, it attempts to correct for the
paucity of interpretation under a historically shaped knowledge production regime. The
supernatural world that Baldy invokes is a powerful one, one where the land isn’t an extension of
geography, but is an uninterrupted gradation(s) of sacred power (much like in Doueihi’s vision,
minus a good portion of the poststructuralist baggage), and a name is meaning. Baldy may very
well have access to that world, but as far as non-Indigenous interpretation is concerned, that is
neither here nor there. The postsecularist begins with the acknowledgement that it is not for
critics of this world to resolve the paradox of Indigenous metaphysics. Believing in the validity
of the other world, the postsecular critic extends the logic of the intermediary medium that they
have access (and a responsibility) to, in order to build symbolic I →We→… relations across
levels of interpenetrating thematic (self)organization: this work is always performed in a way
that circles back to the paradox of I-We gestationality that made interpretation possible in the
first place.
It is best to preface demonstration with comparison. Smith, along with Flick, have
discussed the historical references at play in an early scene in Green Grass in which Alberta (the

history professor who’s seeing Charlie and Lionel) first introduces the historical Fort Marion to
her college students. Familiar names from Native American history make an appearance in
Alberta’s student roster, including Henry Dawes and John Collier. As Smith notes, “King’s
reference to these famous ‘students ’of Indian cultures alludes to the inevitable and disastrous
result of objectifying Native American society” (522). Henry Dawes of course, refers to the
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senator famous for pushing forward the Dawes Act of 1887, which fundamentally restructured
tribal relationships to land in the United States. Passed without any Indigenous consent or input,
the act “promised to break up the tribe as a social unit, encourage private enterprise and farming,
reduce the cost of Indian administration, fund the emerging boarding school system (with the
sale of 'surplus land’), and provide a land base for white settlement” (Treuer 145). The Ojibwe
anthropologist and critic David Treuer quotes Merrill Gates, chairman of the Board of Indian
Commissioners from 1899-1912, to capture the spirit of the law: “We must make the Indian
more intelligently selfish […] By acquiring property, man puts forth his personality and lays
hold of matter by his own thought and will” (144). In Alberta’s class, the transformed Henry
Dawes supplies his professor with a sustained exchange on Plains Indian Ledger Art, which as
explained by Alberta, were produced in Fort Marion by twenty-six (out of seventy-two) southern
Plains Natives who had been captured by the U.S. Army in 1874. Unable to see beyond his
ignorance, Dawes demonstrates a complete inability to understand Indigenous art. When
prompted, he states that “they’re kind of like stick figures” and that they “use browns and reds a
lot […] Maybe it was traditional or something like that” (King 17). For a critic like Smith, the
interaction presents a “fixed homogenetic cultural matrix” (522), which is about all there is to
say; having set up his analytic apparatus using this scene, Smith sees that he has bigger fish to
fry and moves on to bluer waters.

Nobody could fault Smith, for Green Grass teems with an overabundance of cultural
references and allusions. One could extract meaning with abandon. But what if interpretive
methodology attempted to absorb into the world of the Green Grass and embody the text’s
inexhaustibility as much as it extracted from it? What might that look like? The metonymically
reproduced Henry Dawes can appear exhausted as a sign, but the metonym already gestates a
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metaphor, and the metaphor inherently unfurls a metonymic chain (and so on and so forth) so
postsecular interpretation might as well let the text read itself. For starters, by imaginatively
cutting through time and recognizing the present-day college student Henry Dawes (I) within a
historic We that included like-minded compatriots of the historical Dawes—say fellow members
of the “Friends of the Indian”—a crystal clear historic picture emerges. In Native American
history, the sign of Henry Dawes signifies the homogeneous space of capital, what “Henri
Lefebvre describes as the […] ‘subordination [of land] to the unifying but abstract principle of
property ’antithetical to the sacred and to ‘lived experience’” (qtd. in Huhndorf 361). A distorted
relationship with the land results in an inability to comprehend Indigenous art. Interpretive
incapacity can signal many things, from intellectual obstinance to lack of knowledge, but
fundamentally, it reveals a break in how a person comes to know in the first place (which then of
course, feeds into how one relates to the land). Indigenous art, like Coyote First Person’s stories,
are “living Indigenous epistemologies” (Baldy 5). The machinations of the Western
epistemological-ontological foundation that causes both embodiments of Henry Dawes to
perceive Indigenous culture only as primitive and “traditional” remains untouched through time.
The greatest strength of postsecular criticism might very well lie in its willingness to
associate and relate beyond the confines of nation statist space-time. Alberta’s classroom keys
readers in to this other-worldly space by gathering Henry Dawes, Mary Rowlandson and Hannah

Duston in the same room (another We). The historical Mary Rowlandson was a colonial
Massachusetts Puritan woman who had been living in the frontier settlement of Lancaster when
she was captured by allied Indigenous warriors during King Philip’s War (Cloyd 78). Her
autobiographical captivity narrative became one of colonial America’s earliest best sellers in
1682 and went on to define the genre (78). Meanwhile, Hannah Duston, another famous name in
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the genre, is often characterized as the “mother of the American tradition of scalp-hunting”
(Grenier 40-1). From Mary Rowlandson to John Collier—their implausible, other-worldly
synchronicity constructs a diachronic story on the role that cultural imagination has played in
justifying and perpetuating colonial violence. The postsecular interpreter summons a story that
makes no temporal, spatial, or categorical distinction between a college student’s dismissal of
Indigenous art, the military conquest of southern Plains Native Nations, and the benevolent,
reformist policies of John Collier. Violence is violence.
Thus, Green Grass begins to spill out of its physical embodiment as a discrete, mass
market paperback book. It builds new associations beyond the text that encourage readers to
understand that the latest colonial justifications for controlling Indigenous land, no matter their
“good intentions” are still in bad faith. But books with no interest in matters beyond this-world
can build hypertextual bridges too. After all, Smith has already offered a perfectly reasonable,
this-worldly explanation of the interpretive agency of Green Grass:
As a novel it “theorizes” itself, rather than becoming the repository/subject or
object of theoretical discussion. More important, as a trickster narrative the novel
marks the reader’s necessary ability to recreate the text, rather denoting the ways
in which the text fractures and recreates itself. For King, and for trickster fictions
in general, the individual and orality combine to function as a subtextual counter-

narrative to written textuality. (Emphasis mine; Smith 532)
Chapter 1 already problematized the post- in postsecular, so it’s no surprise that Smith’s insight
describes a lot of what goes on in the name of postsecular critique. Small cracks can turn into
surprisingly large openings, however. The key argument of this chapter is that more than just
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theorizing itself, Green Grass conjures/divinates/purifies/heals itself, and central to that process
is discrete individuality’s willingness to recognize that it is always-already dissolving.
Returning to Alberta’s history lecture, one could choose to view it as a framing narrative
for the four ensuing stories told by the four storytellers, though strictly speaking, in “I’s” plotting,
the storyteller’s opening ritual precedes Alberta’s class. Since the opening ritual occurs outside
of this-worldly space and time, there’s no way to tell if it actually “precedes” Alberta’s lecture in
any meaningful sense. As already explained, who came before whom is not something that the
four storytellers worry themselves over anyway. Transposing text based ritual onto the symbolic
realm illuminates an intriguing connection between Alberta’s lecture and the opening act of an
idi:gawé:sdi—self-identification. Ritualistically (and metaphorically) speaking, Alberta’s lecture
declares this is my name (Kilpatrick 29), these are my people (29), we are stuck in history. The
essence of history has been made the target of supernatural intervention. Alberta’s identification
summons the four storytellers whose temporal logics (since they precede their own origin
stories) cannot be accounted for, at least in this-world. More specifically, in terms of their
respective plotting, their Western “given” names always precede, and then take over their
Indigenous names, which mirrors the tautological trap that Alberta has summoned them into: I
think I am an Indian, therefore I am (Bailey 44). Alberta’s self-identification, in other words,
predetermines the course of her spell: each of the four storytellers end their stories with the

appearance of Fort Marion, while in this-world, Alberta’s world, all of the four story tellers (as
Lone Ranger, Ishmael, Robinson Crusoe, and Hawkeye) return to Dr. Joseph Hovaugh’s hospital
in Florida (which, as if the pun on Joe Hovaugh’s name wasn’t enough, comes with its own
perfectly organized garden, described in detail the volume that encodes “East” in its header)
again not too far from the historic fort. The I-We gestationality of the four storytellers causes
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their origin stories to fill out a fractal relational diagram. Each of the four stories represent
distinct, self-contained, ritual(ized) story performances. Put together, the four performances
collapse into one unified performance, with Alberta as the unwitting medicine (wo)man that
performs the introductory incantation. Alberta’s seemingly “immaculate” conception in the final
volume of the novel takes on a whole new level of significance in this context; in addition to
subverting reproductive heteronormativity, it instantiates Indigenous autopoiesis. Without her
even knowing, Alberta has accomplished an interruption in history that might enable Indigeneity
to finally gestate itself. Or she’s just pregnant.
Storied meaning conjured itself in the case of Alberta and the four story tellers; a
question remains as to whether the reader/audience can symbolically conjure stories and
meanings on their own. It might be worth a very cautious and very limited try. Baldy gives this
irresponsible novice conjurer a possible in with her metaphysical claim that stories by Coyote
First Person eternally link Indigeneity to land. Baldy’s insight—it must be noted that in Old and
Middle English, insight meant “penetrating with the eyes of the understanding into the […]
hidden nature of things” (OED)—is the other-worldly force that this non-Indigenous settler,
performing this symbolic conjuration according to the exigencies of academic life on
dispossessed Muscogee (Creek) land, will invoke. Unlike the conjurer, who uses verbal dexterity
to unsettle time, this interpreter will utilize the thematic/organizational mutability of I-We

gestationality to think through time to the best of his ability, though he makes no promises.
The preceding chapter laid bare the Christian roots of (American) secularism. It also
borrowed the words of Deloria and Vizenor to demonstrate that the sign of the “Indian” has
played a crucial role in consolidating the foundational pillars of secular, North American
modernity: proprietary rights, homogenized, socially organized space, and the rational, self-
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possessed subject. The Other in the shape of an “Indian wilderness” has always acted as the
sacrificial vehicle for the construction of American/Canadian nation space-time.19 The story of
secular modernity is the story of disappearing the Native to tame the wilderness. The
introduction of technology and technocracy merely switched out the actors to the same old
story.20 The triumphant story of secular modernity is what this thesis seeks to disturb. Up until
now, in a roundabout way, I’ve been narrating a story of how the this-world of Green Grass
came to be. Now I beg the interpretive community’s indulgence as I try to bring to life an
associational narrative of my own that 1) cuts through, and cuts from, different textual,
metatextual, and hypertextual realities and in doing so 2) disrupts the autonomy and discrete
embodiments of Enlightenment subjectivity and 3) explores new I-We relationalities across time
and space. I believe that King leaves open a tiny crack in his paratext. Water will slip me in.

2.2

Going to the Water

“Okay, says Coyote, if you say so. But where did all the water come from?” (King 469).
“I says. ‘Sit down and listen’” (253). “When that River starts flowing again, it flows real fast. It
flows around those rocks, and it flows past those trees […] La, la, la, la, says that River, and it
keeps going faster and faster. And pretty soon it is going very fast. It goes so fast, it goes right
off the edge of the world” (255-6).
MF: Floated in and out.
TK: Floated in and out. Although those two guys gloated in and out […] I’m not

See Constance Post’s Essay, “Old World Order in the New: John Eliot and ‘Praying Indians’ in Cotton
Mather’s Magnalia Christi Americana” for a demonstration of how the idea of an “Indian Wilderness” played a
foundational role in shaping the social imaginary of a nascent United Sates.
20
As Deloria notes, “Science and philosophy simply copied the institutional paths already taken by Western
religion and mystified themselves so that one of the maxims of recent Western civilization has been to declare
something to be ‘academic’” (Red Earth, White Lies 17).
19
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sure but I think—Lueders is listed as the Chair of my committee on the final
Ph.D. dissertation […] I mean, I think it’s a reasonably poor dissertation. (Fee and
Gunew)

TK: I’ve always said that Green Grass probably more than my thesis was my
dissertation.
JA: I can believe that.” (Andrews 168).
TK: […] I’m working with the idea that we do nothing about the kind of ‘wastes ’
that we create in the world […] As long as we continue to do this our
metaphorical toilets are going to back up (182).
Coyote: “Hmmmm […] All this water imagery must meang something” (King
391).
“One of these days we’re going to open the floodgates, the water is going to pour down the
channels, the generators are going to start” (King 156).
“What happens when it breaks?” (157).
“It’s not going to break, Eli. Just think of the dam as part of the landscape.” (148)
“hey they think the earth is moving under the dam” (149).

“Watch the toilet,” Latisha called after her. “Sometimes it overflows.”
“Don’t they all,” Jeanette called back, sounding very far away. “Don’t they all” (148).

First things first: water does not care about dams. Water rains, flows, freezes, pools,
stinks, giggles (255), talks (432), rocks (389), calms down (390), and so on and so forth. Some
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theorists will dismiss the embodiment of water with the same condescension that Henry Dawes
showed toward Plains Indian Ledger art. “To speak thus is to use the aesthetic as an anesthetic”
(Morton 10), they will say; “To theorize ecological views is also to bring thinking up to date”
(Morton 10, emphasis mine). Digging their heels further into secularist quicksand, they will
chant “Nature, a transcendental term in a material mask […] Nature. A metonymic series
becomes a metaphor […] Nature wavers in between the divine and the material” (14). Strange,
that. Why reinstall tired old binaries in the name of tearing them down? Even though these critics
can be penetrating in their diagnosis of “nature” (namely, that it furnished a “new secular
church” for romanticism) their unreflexive regurgitation of secular dogma
(transcendent/metaphoric/not-yet-arrived vs material/metonymic/up-to-date) leads them to a
particularly regressive brand of historicization, the progress narrative (23).
And how incredulous we should all be of progress by now! Throw technology,
instrumentalism and institutional brawn into the mix, and one gets an even scarier beast,
developmentalism. The modern megadam is its highest achievement; as Rob Nixon says, “big
dams are (beyond any possible utility) a kind of national performance art” (156). America, it
must be noted, played a historic role in pioneering megadams as well as in opposing them: “John
Muir, Edward Abbey, Wallace Stegner, and David Brower […] All these writers […] lived in the
[…] American West and all were associated primarily with a wilderness ethic” (155).

Romanticist engineering faced off against romanticist conservationism, and the “Indian,” once
again, had no place in either camp. The dam becomes a monumental materialization of a tight
semiotic knot that ties naturalized history (one that fossilizes the Indian inside the strata of
national history) to historicized nature (one that inscribes and reinscribes the Enlightenment
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subject into the natural world) and precludes all Indigenous land relations, which precludes all
Indigenous storytelling, which precludes all Indigeneity.21
—
Thus, all things point to the dam in Green Grass. The four storytellers journey from
Florida to Alberta to be with Eli at the moment when the dam fails. Their stories too, reference
their way towards the dam, first in First Woman’s partner, Ahdamn, then in Moby Jane the whale
(which alludes to the dam’s name, the Grand Baleen Dam, which again references out to a nonfictional dam in Quebec built on Cree land), then in successive figurations of water that become
increasingly personified and agentive.
As if mirroring the growing agentivity of water in Volumes 3 and 4, Eli, the sole person
responsible for the halting the dam’s operation (which seems to have less to do with his own
intentions and more to do with the way in which all the worlds are closing in on the dam), loses
his. Volumes 3 and 4 narrate Eli’s past decision not to return home as he inexplicably begins to
reconnect with old friends and family in the present timeline. Eli’s process of reconnection
reaches its apogee at the Sun Dance, where/when all of the novel’s Blackfoot characters (save for
Charlie), the four storytellers, and Coyote all converge on the symbolic and spatial “center”
which grounds as much as it sets adrift: “Below in the distance, a great circle of tepees floated on
the prairies, looking for all the world like sailing ships adrift on the ocean” (402). The land

behaves like water, clearing up any possible confusion over how Indigenous land relations relate
to water relations. Out of water emerges land (39) and digging through land leads to water (386);
the I-We gestationality of the two dissolves the geographer’s riddle, “is water bound by land or is

21

For a powerful explanation of how Enlightenment subjectivity structures natural science (specifically geology)
and in doing so renders black bodies fungible, see A Billion Black Anthropocenes or None (2018) by Kathryn
Yusoff.
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land bound by water?” Like metaphor and metonymy, like transcendence and immanence, land
and water always-already birth each other. Eli proceeds to circle around the camp (405, 414),
pulled along by his relations, until he intervenes in an altercation between Latisha and her
estranged American husband George, who has come to photograph the Sun Dance. Even then Eli
plays more of a facilitative role for his nephew Lionel, who will say the magic words that will
mark his renewal to the four storytellers. Lionel says to the interloper, “There’s nothing for you
here” (427), and by that time Eli has left without a word to make his way towards the dance.
Like Smith, I conclude my analysis with Eli because I believe that the unwitting
destroyer of Grand Baleen dam might have something interesting to say for himself. He clearly
signals that the meaning of his storyline is structured by what he hasn’t said, when he says to
Lionel “Can’t just tell you that straight out. Wouldn’t make any sense. Wouldn’t be much of a
story” (400). Though he has a clear understanding of the narrative that he had previously fallen
into, the narrative of the “Indian who couldn’t go home” (317), he can’t explain to himself, or to
others, why he decided to return to the reservation to live in the old home his mother had built.
He has nothing to say about his motivation for fighting the operators of the dam either, though he
does admit that he’s developed a perverse appreciation for the routine (or shall we say ritual) of
refusing Sifton, the company representative. Smith, who’s methodology locks him out of the
interiority of Eli’s self-mystification, zooms out to the interpretive community beyond the text

for answers. From his vantage point, Eli’s character exists to serve. His silence and his death
invites readers to “construct their own meaning […] As readers of a ‘performative ’postmodern
trickster tale we are indeed invited to participate” (Smith 531). Eli understands that “telling the
story requires other stories, perhaps even stories that go beyond him” (Smith 529), so he remains
silent and waits for the surging floodwaters take him away. It’s a depressing story. The “Indian
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that left the reservation” has ossified into the “stoic Indian” whose death invites further symbolic
extraction by readers hungry for meaning. The next dam that goes up on Indigenous land will be
bigger, shinier, and more earthquake resistant. History marches on.
But not so quick. What do we make of the fact that “I” and Eli never coincide in the same
scene? Why does Alberta never meet the four “old Indians,” when so many others do (429)?
Here the crafty storyteller, the one that lives outside the novel, seems to have planted a clue,
since earlier we discovered a logic of discrete embodiment in the narratives of the four
storytellers, one where the embodied integrity of the storyteller remains sacrosanct for the
duration of their performance. That logic dictated that “there is only one Thought Woman”
within Thought Woman’s story, meaning that there is only one embodied storyteller, no matter
the multiplicity of Indigenous knowledges and traditions represented by Thought Woman (302).
Now we might add a second rule, one where the “master” embodiment of the storyteller and the
“sub”-embodiment(s) of the storyteller cannot coincide in the same space-time. It must be
clarified that both rules are rules that exist for the intelligibility of this-world only, where discrete
embodiments and exclusionary syntax matter for the purposes of thought formation—thought
that then reproduces the world as same, shot through with “master” versus “sub-” and inside
versus outside relations. Earlier we found out that Alberta could very well be the “master”
storyteller that had summoned Lone Ranger, Ishmael, Robinson Crusoe, and Hawkeye, so it

makes sense that their paths never intersect in Blossom, Alberta. This causative logic means one
thing for Eli, who’s wry, ironic voice sometimes sounds suspiciously similar to that of “I.” Of
course, on the this-worldly narrative plane, there always exists the highly reasonable explanation
that people don’t cross paths because their paths simply don’t cross, end of story. Given that
choice and given the other, with no convincing reason to not choose otherwise, I choose the
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Other. I choose to believe in a continuity/contiguity that links together Thomas King, the
literature professor, writer, and activist, the “I” that brings all of the stories into existence, and
Eli, the literature professor turned dam saboteur who makes possible the “main event” of the
novel (aside from the initial main event of “So.”).
A new world reveals itself, where “I” tells the story of Eli (among others), and King tells
the story of them both. At the same time, Eli tells the story of King writing Green Grass, who
wants his stories to reveal just the right things to just the right people. Because names can mean,
we can’t forget that Eli’s name already tells its own story, with its reference to the Biblical
Elijah, who confronts the king Ahab and brings the rain. Take another step back and here I am,
purportedly conjuring a new story by writing about all three. Who’s telling the story of whom?
It’s best not to ask such questions or we’ll be here forever. The most important moral of this
particular story, probably, is this: I believe we have all the power, and no power at all. The same
Eli that that culture and history has condemned to die in an earthquake related flood is the same
Eli whose actions make possible the story that “I” tells. Likewise, the same Alberta whose
history lesson has unintentionally doomed Indigenous consciousness to a perpetual loop of
misnaming is the Alberta that has gestated Indigenous futurity. What we do in this world has
incomprehensible importance even when it doesn’t matter at all. Like Eli basking in the sun with
Coyote and the storytellers, we might find that water is already coming for us.

So. This thesis just might have found a way to retrieve ritual from the Western history of
religion, where ritual, for too long, had been humanized, whether as formal practice or praxis.
Take the enlightenment subject out of the formula, and a new kind of ritual surfaces, one that
people might participate in without their knowing. This new perspective on ritual allows for
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expanding, interconnected associations and thematizations. Weather patterns can be said to
unfold ritualistically; changing climatological rituals can be said to affect the mating rituals of
birds. Once again, Indigenous Studies proves itself to be ahead of the game, for it was Deloria
that already explained that “In the religious world of most tribes, birds, animals, and plants
compose the ‘other peoples’ of creation. Depending on the ceremony, various of these ‘peoples’
participate in human activities” (278). The sacredness of the land and its inhabitants “does not
depend on human occupancy but on the stories that describe the revelation that enabled human
beings to experience the holiness there” (278). Land based conceptions of sacredness and ritual
add an interesting twist to Nixon’s idea of environmental “slow violence.” For many Indigenous
tribes, environmental degradation and spiritual degradation represent two sides of the same coin.
A secularizing environment that makes the land uninhabitable for Indigenous consciousness and
spirituality could narrate the slowest of all slow violences: one that arguably began with the Pope
signing over the so-called New World to Spain in 1493 and continues on to this day with
governmental refusal to recognize Indigenous rituals, ceremonies, customs and ways of life.
Vizenor might be right in the end; there is nothing left to do but tell more stories. Two
constants thread their way through all figurations of storytelling ritual. First is the relationality
inherent to ritual as an intermediary, performative medium. Through ritual, I begins to relate to a
We that always-already gestates an I. Second is the storiedness of ritual, a characteristic that
owes itself to the structure of ritual as an I-We performative-interpretive of aporetic agentivity.
Regardless of its ending, story always brings itself back to the storyteller, who in the end is left
with the fragments and residue of their own thoughts. So the best kind of postsecular critique,
one that minds its relations, might be one that just tries to be like water. It is known that the
Cherokee dida:hnese:sgi, the “putter-in-and-drawer-out of them” (Kilpatrick 25), have the ability
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to bring dead ritual texts back to life through certain “Going to the Water” purification rights
(xviii). The embodied Eli, the dead text that couldn’t tell its own story, arguably goes back to the
water to surpass the confines of “nature” and “history.” Non-Indigenous postsecular critique
professes far less ambitious aims. With the acknowledgment that it may, at any moment, veer
into the kind of “Yuppie shamanism” that King abhors (“Godzilla vs Post-Colonial” 188), it
humbles itself, and does its best to responsibly “put in” as much as it “draws out.” That way, the
(pre-/post-/supra-/inter-/intra-)symbolic river continues to flow, and a people without history are
also a people with an inviolate (his/her/their/…)story. That way, there is water everywhere.
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